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As courts administer the criminal law, they face a continuing ten-
sion between the police's need to gather criminal evidence and the peo-
ple's right to privacy. The courts have had particular difficulty striking
that balance when defining the circumstances that justify a warrantless
search of private premises to prevent destruction of evidence. The
Supreme Court has infrequently considered the question and has never
provided a clear standard for determining when warrantless action is jus-
tified.1 The courts of appeals have developed conflicting solutions to the
problem. 2 The current national preoccupation with drug trafficking 3
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1. See infra section I.
2. See infra sections II & III.
3. Between 1960 and 1985, for example, arrests for drug abuse violations jumped from
.7% of the total number of persons arrested in 1960 to 6.95% in 1985, an increase of almost
600%. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES (July 1986). Estimates of cocaine importation have increased from 15-18
billion dollars in 1979 to 39 billion in 1984. Busch & Schnoll, Cocaine-Review of Current
Literature and Interface with the Law, in 3 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 283, 285
(1985). In a recent survey of members of the United States House of Representatives con-
ducted by that body's Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96% of the members
responding to the survey characterized the drug abuse in their districts as either moderate or
severe, with the reports equally divided between those two conditions. As a result of hearings
held by the Select Committee, the Committee found that:
(1) [t]he continuing spread and increasing intensity of the drug abuse prob-
lem-in rural as well as in urban areas- with trafficking in a wide variety of drugs
increasing at an alarming rate; and 2) [a]lmost all Members of Congress have had
constituents express concern about drug abuse and drug trafficking and ask for con-
gressional action to combat both problems.
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suggests that the government may more often seek to justify warrantless
entries into private premises on the basis of threatened destruction of
evidence. Unlike most other evidence, drugs can usually be destroyed
with the flush of a toilet or the opening of a tap. 4 Public concern about
the drug problem encourages the police to intensify their enforcement
efforts, 5 which in turn will increase the number of times police are faced
with a real or imagined possibility that evidence will be destroyed. At-
tempts to broaden police power in this area must be expected.
Notwithstanding the legitimate societal interest in crime control,
other important values are at stake. The fourth amendment protects in-
dividuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 6 Its principal role is
the promotion of freedom by limiting governmental interference in the
affairs of individuals, 7 although it is frequently discussed in terms of pri-
vacy.8 This role has been described most eloquently by Justice Brandeis
Kurke, Congressional Review of National Problems in Drug Abuse and Its Control, in 3
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES & THE LAW 241, 244-45 (1985). President and Mrs. Reagan have
called for a "national crusade" against this "cancer of drugs." Boyd, Reagans Advocate 'Cru-
sade' on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
4. "[T]he possibility of destruction of evidence exists in every narcotics investigation."
United States v. Moreno, 701 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated, 758 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.
1985).
5. Purdum, 200 Police Officers Being Added to Division to Combat Narcotics, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1986, at B1, col. 3.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
7. Freedom, after all, is the ability to do what one wants, which requires, at least, the
right to limit the manner and instance of governmental interference with one's thoughts, ac-
tions and possessions. Privacy is certainly a value protected by the amendment, but privacy.
or the ability to control the personal information the government acquires and the property
one possesses, is a sub-value of freedom itself. On freedom and property and their relation to
popular sovereignty, see generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION
12-22 (1948); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 214-22
(1969); see also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349.
353-77 (1974).
8. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment
is the protection of privacy rather than property..."). Professor Weinreb describes the pri-
vacy protected by the fourth amendment as having two distinct aspects. The first type of
privacy protected by the fourth amendment "enables us to do the things that we like to do but
do badly, things that we are a bit embarrassed about doing: to meet a friend quietly, to act out
love and hate, to do all the things that we should not do in the same way at high noon in Times
Square." The second type of privacy
allows us to extend our personality by stamping it on a place without displaying it
publicly. It allows us to leave our pajamas on the floor, the bed unmade and dishes
in the sink, pictures of secret heroes on the wall, a stack of comic books or love letters
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in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States9 as "the right to be let
alone- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 10 Thus, the fourth amendment connotes a reverence for
personal liberty that restricts the government from detaining a citizen
even briefly without appropriate cause,"I respect for the sanctity of the
home that demands the highest standard before that threshold may be
crossed, 12 and regard for possession of property that prohibits the gov-
ernment from seizing it without authorization or emergency.
13
The requirement that searches and seizures be conducted pursuant
to warrants issued only upon probable cause by a neutral and detached
magistrate is central to the fourth amendment. 14 The warrant require-
on the shelf; it allows us to be sloppy or compulsively neat, to enjoy what we have
without exposing our tastes to the world.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 47, 52-53 (1974).
9. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
10. Id. at 478.
11. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Rail v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891));
see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (essential purpose of proscriptions in
fourth amendment to impose a standard of reasonableness upon exercise of discretion by gov-
ernmental officials in order to safeguard privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (fourth amendment re-
quires reasonable seizure, and reasonableness depends on balance between public interest and
individual's right to personal security).
12. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of set-
tings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the
unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its
roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: "The right of the people to be secure
in their ... houses ... shall not be violated." That language unequivocally estab-
lishes the proposition that "[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."
Id. at 589-90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); see also Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971) (search or seizure taking place on a suspect's
property without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless police can show it falls within an
exception).
13. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700-02 (1983); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-95 (1914).
14. In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), for example, the Court stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
Id. at 13-14.
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ment has two effects. First, it protects people against unjustified govern-
ment interference with their lives by restricting searches to those based
on probable cause.' 5 Second, it protects against capricious intrusions
conducted at the whim of government officials by requiring that neutral
magistrates authorize warrants.' 6  Searches conducted without a war-
rant are "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specially established and well delineated exceptions."'
7
"These exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be
a 'showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the
situation made [the search] imperative.' "18 The burden is on the govern-
ment to show that the search falls within one of the exceptional
situations. 19
15. Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 411.
16. Id. The exercise of indiscriminate or arbitrary power is central to the concerns of the
fourth amendment. "The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in
order to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy
and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see Loewy, The
Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1239
(1983) ("The single theme running through the entire history of the fourth amendment is
arbitrariness."); Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 410-12.
17. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). It is impossible to identify an indi-
vidual case in which the Supreme Court took a definitive position making warrantless searches
per se unreasonable. See Williamson, The Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent
Circumstances, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 110, 116 (1978). Rather, beginning in the dissents of Justice
Frankfurter in the 1940s and 1950s and continuing through the decisions of the 1960s, the
Court has slowly adopted the view that searches must be made pursuant to warrants unless
urgency and necessity justify other action. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) (no discussion of proper relationship between reasonable search and warrant clause);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (recognizing that it was "reasonable" for
Congress to permit warrantless searches of automobiles when it was not "practicable to secure
a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought."); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (recognizing right
to make warrantless search of house incident to lawful arrest); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that any search or seizure con-
ducted without a warrant was unreasonable unless the circumstances preclude the obtaining of
a warrant); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (invalidating warrantless entry indi-
cating that only "exceptional circumstances" would suffice to dispense with a warrant, without
explanation or authority); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) (reaffirming
Johnson and adding that there were no facts showing that a delay to get a warrant would have
endangered the search); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)(repeating the argument made in his Harris dissent).
18. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958), and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
19. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970). The exceptions to the warrant requirement
include the following: automobile searches, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925);
searches pursuant to consent, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); searches inci-
dent to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), seizures in plain view, Coo-
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Cases involving exigent circumstances, which by definition, require
immediate police action,20 fall within one of these exceptions. A war-
rantless search to prevent destruction of evidence is a sub-category of this
exception.21 The Supreme Court has concluded that the need to prevent
destruction of evidence is one type of exigent circumstance that may jus-
tify warrantless action but has not defined at what point the fear that
evidence might be destroyed becomes sufficient to justify warrantless ac-
tion. The Court has never approved a warrantless entry into private
premises on this basis, 22 although it has suggested that evidence "in the
process of destruction" 23 or "threatened with destruction" 24 may justify
such action.
Despite the Supreme Court's lack of assistance, 25 the circuit courts
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); limited searches and seizures under the stop and
frisk doctrine, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); searches and seizures in hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); and searches and seizures in exigent
circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Excluding consent, all exceptions to
the warrant requirement derive from an emergency. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Excep-
tion to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 419, 425
(1973). The development of "specifically established and well delineated exceptions" like
search incident and automobile searches was merely a recognition that certain circumstances
presented emergencies so frequently that the court was willing to accept the presence of an
exigency whenever the intrusion occurred in that factual situation without regard to whether
there was actually an emergency in the particular case. See United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
20. "Exigent circumstances" is the Supreme Court's category for events not falling into
the other specific exceptions but nonetheless requiring immediate action. This exception allows
for a warrantless search or seizure where there is a compelling need for immediate official
action and time does not permit the procurement of a warrant. The Court considers the facts
of each case to determine whether it is a "now or never" situation. See, e.g., McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 451-56 (1948).
21. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Other approved purposes are (1) to discover the cause of a recent unexplained fire, Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); (2) to retrieve a possibly loaded gun vulnerable to discovery by
vandals, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); and (3) to enter without a warrant when
officers reasonably believe someone is inside premises in need of immediate aid, Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
22. In only one instance has the Court permitted a warrantless intrusion to prevent the
destruction of evidence. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). That case, however,
was unique; it involved the alcohol content in the arrestee's blood, evidence that was inelucta-
bly being destroyed by the defendant's metabolic process. No police action could have pre-
vented its destruction, nor could the need for a search warrant have been foreseen. Few other
circumstances can provide such urgency or inevitability.
23. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
24. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
25. The Court's lack of guidance may be the result of a conflict among its members about
the proper resolution of the problem. Opinions both in support of and dissenting from the
denial of certiorari in United States v. Vasquez, 454 U.S. 975 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in
the denial of certiorari) and 454 U.S. 983 (1981) (Brennan, J., with whom Justices White and
Marshall joined, dissenting from the denial of certiorari), show that at least four members of
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frequently consider the question of whether, and at what point, possible
destruction of evidence justifies warrantless action and have developed
different approaches. 26 All of the circuits agree that destruction of evi-
dence is an exigent circumstance that may justify warrantless action,
27
but they do not evaluate claims of exigency in the same manner. Numer-
ous approaches have emerged, but they can be grouped into three catego-
ries: (1) the "examine-avoid" approach, exemplified by courts that
critically evaluate the police officer's assertion that an emergency exists
and also require that officers avoid warrantless action when possible; (2)
the "uncritical" approach, illustrated by courts that accept at face value
the police officer's assertion that an emergency exists and do not affirma-
tively require that police avoid warrantless action although possible; and
(3) the "examine-only" approach employed by courts that critically eval-
uate the police officer's assertion that an emergency exists, but do not
require that officers avoid the need for warrantless action although
possible.
The divergent approaches in this area present two major problems.
First, inconsistent standards produce inconsistent results, so that
searches that are upheld in one circuit would be condemned in another.
A federal system, based on a single constitution, cannot tolerate such a
result. The constitution does not guarantee greater or lesser degrees of
freedom from governmental intrusion based on geography. Every person
has the right to the same fourth amendment protections, whether he re-
sides in Montana or Mississippi. Second, and more dangerous, the lack
of firm guidance in this area permits some circuits to view too generously
the circumstances that justify warrantless action. This may presage de-
velopment of a broad new exception to the warrant requirement, seri-
ously threatening traditional fourth amendment values.
This Article examines the problem of preventing the destruction of
evidence in the context of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement.
Section I examines the Supreme Court decisions dealing with warrantless
action to prevent the destruction of evidence. Section II discusses the
circuits' discordant approach to this issue. Section III illustrates the di-
the Court disagree about the meaning of the Court's cases in the area and the status of the law
as enforced in the circuits. In any event, despite the frequency with which the Court is
presented with the question, it has repeatedly refused to consider it. See, e.g., United States %.
Webster, 750 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v.
Knobeloch, 746 F.2d 1366 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006 (1985); United States v.
Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656 (lst Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985); United States v.
Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984).
26. See infra section II.
27. See infra note 76.
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vergent results produced by application of the three different approaches
developed in section II to a hypothetical case problem. Section IV dis-
cusses the need for a uniform rule for evaluating official action in this
area. Finally, in section V, this Article proposes the following rule: Po-
lice may make a warrantless entry into private premises when: (1) they
have probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity is lo-
cated within; (2) they can articulate facts that create reasonable suspicion
that evidence would be destroyed before a warrant could be obtained; (3)
the circumstances giving rise to the threat of destruction must be neither
avoidable by reasonably prudent officers nor created by them; and (4) the
invasion of fourth amendment interests should be no greater than the
circumstances require to maintain the status quo until a warrant can be
obtained.28 This rule encourages police officers to use warrants but per-
mits them to make informed decisions before making warrantless entries.
The standard authorizes warrantless intrusions in specific, limited cir-
cumstances without undermining vital fourth amendment values.
I. The Supreme Court's Treatment of Warrantless Searches to
Prevent Destruction of Evidence
There are few United States Supreme Court decisions involving
threatened destruction of evidence, the Court having considered the sub-
ject only six times.29 In none of these cases has the Court permitted a
warrantless entry into premises based merely on the possibility that evi-
dence might be destroyed. 30 Furthermore, none of the cases mentioning
28. There are a few extraordinary circumstances where maintaining the status quo will
not protect the evidence. Police may be excused from alternative action when the evidence is
actually in the process of destruction.
29. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
30. Since 1966, the Court has frequently mentioned destruction of evidence in cases in-
volving other issues but in no case has evidence actually been admitted on that basis. See
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (police use of deadly force to prevent escape of
unarmed felon); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (evidence seized from pri-
vate residence pursuant to valid search warrant after illegal entry); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1049 n.14 (1983) (limits of protective search); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 780
(1983) (search of a previously lawfully searched container); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640,
649 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring) (inventory search); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983) (seizure of defendant at airport); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (1981) (auto-
mobile search incident to arrest); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979) (warrantless
search of suitcase seized from trunk of taxicab); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394 (1978)
(warrantless search of murder scene); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563 (1978)
(issuance of search warrant as to party not suspected of crime); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 509 (1978) (warrantless search of fire scene); United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43
(1976) (retreat into private place by defendant following arrest in public place); United States
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threatened destruction of evidence contains extensive discussion of the
subject.
Vale v. Louisiana3 addresses the issue most directly. The Court's
language, however, suggests a standard that lower courts have been re-
luctant to adopt. This language in Vale has probably been the source of
much of the existing confusion among the circuit courts.32 Yet, the disa-
greement after Vale has not been limited to lower courts; recent opinions
by members of the Supreme Court suggest a marked divergence of views
among the Justices.
33
A. The Exigency First Considered
The earliest references to potential destruction of evidence as an in-
dependent justification for warrantless intrusions came in the late 1940s
in Johnson v. United States34 and McDonald v. United States.35 In both
cases, the Court disapproved the search, but implied that a warrantless
search could be upheld in an appropriate case.
In Johnson, the police had probable cause to believe opium was be-
ing smoked in a hotel room, but they lacked a search warrant. They
knocked on the door and, after it was opened by the occupant, an-
nounced their intention to search the premises. 36 Affirming the suppres-
sion of the narcotics evidence discovered during the search, Justice
Jackson stated that:
[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need
for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 435 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (warrantless arrest in public
place); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 592 n.7 (1974) (search of exterior of defendant's
automobile); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 811 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(search and seizure of clothing of defendant in custody); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 230 (1973) (full search of person incident to lawful custodial arrest); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478 (1971) (warrantless seizure of defendant's car from his drive-
way); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 783 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (use of testi-
mony of government agents who monitored by radio transmitter conversations between
defendant and government informant); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (search
incident to arrest); Sibron v. New York. 392 U.S. 40, 46 (1968) (extent of intrusion permissible
pursuant to Terry stop); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (reasonable search for weapons
following "stop"). In the one case in which the Court has upheld the seizure of evidence to
prevent its destruction, the evidence (alcohol in the blood) was being destroyed by the metabo-
lism, a situation of limited applicability. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See
infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Schnerber.
31. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
32. See infra notes 49-67 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
34. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
35. 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
36. Johnson. 333 U.S. at 12.
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contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed
with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered for not ob-
taining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and
some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence
to a magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons and, in these
circumstances, certainly are not enough to bypass the constitutional
requirement. No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight. The
search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evi-
dence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction
37
In McDonald, the Court again rejected the government's claim that
a warrantless search was justified by possible destruction of evidence.
Police entered a rooming house upon hearing the sounds of an adding
machine, under circumstances that gave them probable cause to believe
the defendant was engaged in illegal gambling. They arrested the defend-
ant and seized evidence used to convict him of running an illegal lottery.
The Court, in reversing the conviction, observed: "[T]he defendant was
not fleeing or seeking to escape. Officers were there to apprehend peti-
tioners in case they tried to leave. Nor was the property in the process of
destruction nor was it likely to be destroyed as the opium paraphernalia
in the Johnson case." 38
Thus, destruction of evidence was not the deciding issue in either
Johnson or McDonald. In neither case were the suspects aware of the
police surveillance, nor were there other reasons to think that the evi-
dence would be destroyed or removed. In both cases, the government
also argued that the searches were valid as incident to a lawful arrest,39
but the Court held that the underlying arrests were unlawful and could
37. Id. at 15. The Court's conclusion that no evidence was threatened with destruction
is puzzling. The police could smell the odor of burning opium emanating from the hotel room.
There is no indication in the opinion that they had reason to believe the amount of opium in
the room exceeded the amount actually being smoked, presumably in the bowl of one or more
pipes. Therefore, there was a reasonable basis to believe that the evidence in the room was
literally going up in smoke. The Court seemed to be saying that the officers' testimony that
they smelled opium would be as useful as the opium itself.
38. McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455. Despite the language to the contrary in Johnson, the
Court's language in McDonald referring to Johnson implies that it recognized some danger to
the evidence there.
39. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453. Search incident to a lawful
arrest is an exception to the warrant requirement that permits a warrantless search of an arres-
tee's person and the area within his immediate control at the time of custodial arrest. Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Such searches are lawful if the arrest is lawful and the search
is conducted close to the time of the arrestee's arrest and does not exceed the permissible area.
Reason to believe evidence of criminal activity is present is not necessary. United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). The search is permitted to prevent the arrestee from
using any weapons he may have and to prevent him from destroying any evidence within his
reach. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
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not, therefore, support the subsequent warrantless searches. 40 The Court
mentioned exigency only to note that there was no reason for the officers
not to have obtained a warrant before entering the premises. 4 These
statements, however, have furnished lower courts with an implied basis
for viewing prevention of destruction of evidence as an exception to the
warrant requirement.
42
B. Imminent Destruction of Evidence as Justification
for Warrantless Action
Schmerber v. California43 is the only case in which the Supreme
Court has approved the admission of evidence seized without a search
warrant on the ground that otherwise the evidence would have been de-
stroyed. 44 Schmerber was convicted of driving under the influence of al-
cohol based upon a blood sample taken by a doctor on instruction from
the police, without a warrant and over the defendant's objection. 45 The
Court held that the imminent destruction of evidence constituted an
emergency that justified the warrantless action. The Court reasoned that
because the percentage of alcohol in blood diminishes shortly after one
stops consuming alcohol, such "special facts" justified the search as an
40. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 16-17; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453-54.
41. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 15; McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454-55.
42. At least 40 state and federal courts have relied on that language. See, e.g.. United
States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267
(4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1114 (1985); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 530 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981);
United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220, 1223 (6th Cir. 1976); Guzman v. Estelle, 493 F.2d
532. 536-37 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
414 U.S. 833 (1973); Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487, 491 n.5 (9th Cir. 1960); Fluker v.
State, 171 Ga. App. 415, 416-17, 319 S.E.2d 884, 866 (1984); Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708,
714 (Ind. App. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1226 (1986); Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. 203.
209, 468 A.2d 333, 342 (1983); Commonwealth v. Skea, 18 Mass. App. 685, 700, 470 N.E.2d
385, 391 (1984); State v. Peters, 695 S.W.2d 140, 147 (Mo. App. 1985); State v. Welker, 37
Wash. App. 628, 632-34, 683 P.2d 1110, 1114-15 (1984).
43. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
44. A similar result was reached by the Court three years prior to Schinerber in Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). In Ker, however, the Court's focus was on the failure of police
to comply with Cal. Penal Code § 844, which permitted peace officers to enter a dwelling to
make an arrest on reasonable cause following a demand for admittance and an explanation of
the purpose for which admittance was desired. Although Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980) subsequently determined that warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to
make a routine felony arrest was violative of the fourth amendment, at the time Ker was
decided, police only needed probable cause to arrest, and thus when the officers in Ker entered
the defendant's apartment without a warrant and unannounced in order to prevent the de-
struction of evidence, there was arguably a lesser fourth amendment intrusion than in
SchI erber.
45. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
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"appropriate incident to [Schmerber's] arrest."'46
The rationale for the decision, however, is not entirely clear. Was
the evanescent nature of the evidence the key fact permitting seizure
without a warrant? Or does the word "incident" suggest that the search
was justified under the more traditional search-incident-to-arrest excep-
tion, with the Court's recognition of the ephemeral nature of the evi-
dence merely warranting the particularly intrusive search of the suspect's
body? Although the answer to this question is not clear, the Court later
cites Schmerber as an exigent circumstance case rather than one involv-
ing a search incident to an arrest.47 Schmerber was unique, however; the
special nature of the intrusion into Schmerber's body was noted by the
Court when it refused to rely on prior decisions that involved state inter-
ference with property relationships.48 Moreover, in Schmerber, the evi-
dence was actually being destroyed, a process that could not have been
interrupted by the police. Finally, the officers could not have foreseen
the emergency and obtained a warrant. Thus, Schmerber may have lim-
ited application to a warrantless search of premises.
C. The Prototypical Case: Vale v. Louisiana
Vale v. Louisiana49 is the case most often cited both for and against
the admissibility of evidence seized from a residence without a warrant in
order to prevent destruction of the evidence. In Vale, police with war-
rants for Vale's arrest staked out his residence. After observing an ap-
parent drug transaction, the police arrested Vale in front of the house
and informed him of their intention to search it. When they entered the
house with Vale, one of the officers made a cursory inspection of the
premises and ascertained that no one else was present. Minutes later,
46. Id. at 770-71.
47. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (compelled surgical procedure to
remove bullet from suspect's chest held to constitute unreasonable search under fourth amend-
ment); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) (absent exigent circumstances, warrant-
less nighttime entry into individual's home to make arrest for civil, nonjailable traffic offense
held prohibited by fourth amendment); Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975, 988 (1981)
(warrantless entry into individual's apartment to make cursory inspection of premises held
justified to guarantee evidence was not being destroyed); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978) (state statute permitting warrantless search of individual's apartment simply because a
homicide had occurred there held inconsistent with fourth and fourteenth amendments);
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (compelling witness to furnish voice exemplar
held not to violate fourth amendment).
48. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-69. The Court stated, "[b]ecause we are dealing with
intrusions into the human body rather than with state interferences with property relationships
or private papers-houses, papers, and effects-we write on a clean slate. Limitations on
[searches of property] are not instructive in this context." Id. at 767-68.
49. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
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Vale's mother and brother arrived. The officers then searched the house
and discovered narcotics in a rear bedroom.50
The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the search, noting the ready
destructibility of narcotics and the possibility that other persons may
have been on the premises who could have destroyed the evidence. 51 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that no exigent cir-
cumstances justified the warrantless action.
The decision in Vale is confusing for two reasons. First, in rejecting
the contention that an emergency existed, the Court observed in a single
sentence that "[t]he goods ultimately seized were not in the process of
destruction. ' 52 This language suggests that warrantless action would be
permitted only when the evidence is actually being destroyed. It is the
Court's most widely cited statement governing warrantless action to pre-
serve evidence, 53 but the standard is so restrictive it can rarely be met.
Testimony that the police heard toilets being flushed or saw suspects
burning evidence could meet the standard, but it seems unlikely that
such a showing could be made in many instances. The circuit courts
have assumed that the Supreme Court did not intend that its language be
taken literally, 54 and have refused to restrict warrantless intrusions to
50. Id. at 33.
51. The Louisiana Supreme Court had also upheld the search on the ground, not relevant
to this discussion, that the search was sustainable as a permissible search incident to Vale's
arrest although the arrest occurred outside the house. The United States Supreme Court
quickly rejected this branch of the holding, citing traditional limits to the search incident to
arrest doctrine. Id. at 33-34.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Harbaugh & Faust, "Knock on Any Door"--Home Arrests After Payton and Steagald,
86 DICK. L. REV. 191, 223 n.208 (1982); see, e.g., United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187 (9th
Cir. 1982); People v. Medina, 7 Cal. 3d 30, 38, 496 P.2d 433, 438, 101 Cal. Rptr. 521, 526
(1972); People v. Larry A., 154 Cal. App. 3d 929, 936 n.5, 201 Cal. Rptr. 696, 701 n.5 (1984);
People v. Davis, 86 Ill. App. 3d 557, 562, 407 N.E.2d 1109, 1114 (1980); State v. Nine, 315 So.
2d 667, 673 (La. 1975); State v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281, 290 (Mo. 1975); State v. Weible. 211
Neb. 174, 180, 317 N.W.2d 920, 924 (1982); State v. Seiss, 168 N.J. Super. 269, 277, 402 A.2d
972, 976 (1979); Lugar v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 609, 629, 202 S.E.2d 894, 909 (1974).
54. In United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973),
for example, the Third Circuit panel noted:
Although the court had always spoken of "threatened" destruction or removal of
evidence in previous cases involving the emergency exception, in Vale, it spoke for
the first time of goods "in the process of destruction." Although the language might
suggest that the emergency exception must be construed to require knowledge that
the evidence is actually being removed or destroyed, the omission of a single word
should not be given such significance, especially in light of the facts in Vale.
Id. at 267 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526. 529 (4th Cir.
1981) (where officers reasonably believed that evidence might be destroyed before search war-
rant can be acquired, Vale does not require suppression of evidence); United States v. Rosselli,
506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (government's burden does not require proof of actual
knowledge that evidence is being destroyed); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54-55 (8th
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situations involving actual and ongoing destruction of evidence. 55 The
principal result of this ambiguity has been the formulation of alternative
and varying standards by the circuit courts, which will be discussed in
section 11.56
Second, the Court's failure specifically to address the propriety of
the police entry into Vale's house has contributed to the confusion.
5 7
The police activity in Vale had two distinct components. One, the police
entered the house without a search warrant and passed through the
rooms to ascertain whether other persons were present.58 Two, the police
conducted a search only after Vale's family returned home.59 Rejecting
the Louisiana court's argument that a confederate capable of destroying
evidence could have been in the house, the Court noted that the police
knew that no one else was present when they completed their initial
sweep.60 This statement suggests that the illegal conduct occurred only
after they completed their initial pass through the house. Thus, the
Court may have tacitly viewed the initial entry and limited search as
justified in the circumstances. 61 Vale can thus be cited for two different
Cir. 1973) (explaining how Vale does not alter the rule that evidence threatened with imminent
removal or destruction provides exceptional circumstances justifying warrantless search), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974). Commentators have taken the view that the language should be
accepted literally and have viewed Vale as an example of the traditional special protection
afforded dwellings. See White, The Fourth Amendment As a Way of Talking About People; A
Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 183 n.41; Note, Police Practices and
the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (1971).
55. See cases cited infra note 77.
56. See infra notes 76-194 and accompanying text.
57. Since there was no evidence discovered during the initial search through the premises
and the evidence suppressed was discovered during a later and more intensive search, it is
possible that the Court approved the initial entry. It is unclear whether the Court considered
the propriety of the entry in deciding the case. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 654
(1987); Dressier, A Lesson In Caution, Overwork, and Fatigue: The Judicial Miscraftsmnanship
of Segura v. United States, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 375, 393 n.88 (1985).
58. Vale, 399 U.S. at 33.
59. Id. This knowledge may be more important in Vale than the presence of a suspect's
innocent relatives might be in a different case. According to some commentators, James Vale
was not only the defendant's brother, but also was thought to be a confederate in the drug
enterprise. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawy-
ering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 359 (1973); Kelder & Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recur-
rent Questions Regarding the Propriety of Searches Conducted Contemporaneously With an
Arrest On or Near Private Premises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973, 997 n.67 (1979).
60. Vale, 399 U.S. at 34.
61. At least two commentators have so read Vale. See Dressier, supra note 57, at 375,
393 n.88; Kelder and Statman, supra note 59, at 973, 997 n.68. Without specifically relying on
Vale, the circuit courts do permit a limited search, often called a "protective sweep" or "secur-
ity check" to search for confederates who might endanger the officers or destroy evidence. The
distinctive feature of such a search is that it is designed to discover persons, not evidence, even
though evidence is often discovered in plain view during such a search. See, e.g., United States
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propositions: (1) Vale may prohibit a warrantless search of a dwelling
even when it is known that persons who might destroy evidence are pres-
ent, unless the evidence is known to be in the process of destruction; or
v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222 (lst Cir. 1978) (agents justified in securing defendant's apartment in
view of evidence that defendant was involved in bombings and that stolen explosives were
stored in defendant's apartment); United States v. Artierio, 491 F.2d 440 (2d Cir.) (agents
entering defendant's home complied with spirit of statute authorizing officer to break open
door to execute search warrant and did not violate fourth amendment or statute) (dictum),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974); United States v. Christophe, 470 F.2d 865, 869 (2d Cir.
1972) (agents securing premises after arresting defendant entitled to conduct cursory examina-
tion of premises), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964 (1973).
Occasionally the search may occur, as in Vale, after an arrest outside of a residence and
involve subsequent entry into a residence. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 577 F.2d 1147 (4th
Cir.) (search of house in front of which defendant was arrested not invalid where officers rea-
sonably feared they would be fired on by accomplice inside the house), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
850 (1978); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977) (following shoot-out
between defendant and police, officers had right to conduct quick and cursory check of resi-
dence when they had reasonable grounds to believe that there were others present who might
endanger safety of themselves and others); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.)
(officers' entry after shoot-out with occupants and seizure of evidence in plain view not an
unreasonable search and seizure), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1976). In such an instance, the
search, if undertaken to protect evidence, is an example of a warrantless search of a residence
to protect evidence from destruction. No separate categorization is appropriate, nor should
there be a reduced justification for entry. Yet a number of courts do permit an entry based on
no showing at all for what they call a "protective sweep." See, e.g., United States v. Miller,
449 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (officers' entry in hot pursuit of armed felon justified search and
seizure to assure no dangerous persons were hiding); United States v. Briddle, 436 F.2d 4 (8th
Cir. 1970) (evidence in plain view during officers' quick search of apartment in which defend-
ant was arrested was not fruit of unlawful search and seizure), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 921
(1971); United States v. Cognato, 408 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Conn.) (once officers gained lawful
entry into apartment, they had right to arrest defendant, seize evidence from his person. in-
spect premises, and seize other evidence in plain view), aff'd. 539 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1976), ceri.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
More frequently, a protective sweep is a search through the rooms of a residence after an
otherwise lawful entry to assure the officers that they are not in danger from others. See e.g..
United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1987) (limited protective sweep to secure
premises and ascertain whether there were persons other than defendants on premises who
might pose danger to officers was justified by exigent circumstances); United States v. Escobar.
805 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1986) (officers may conduct security check without warrant when making
arrest on private premises when they reasonably fear that there are other persons within who
may pose threat or are likely to destroy evidence); United States v. Newton, 788 F.2d 1392
(8th Cir. 1986) (officers justified in conducting protective search for a man they thought was
inside house and who might have been cause of another's death); United States v. Gardner. 627
F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (where officers had a reasonable apprehension concerning unknown
and possibly dangerous occupants of residence, warrantless protective sweep did not violate
fourth amendment); United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976) (officers who en-
tered premises of third party to execute arrest warrants and who, after arresting defendants.
heard scuffling sounds coming from bathroom were justified in making a cursory search to
secure immediate area), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). A search undertaken after the of-
ficers are already inside is more accurately considered as a search-incident rubric and is outside
the scope of this Article. For a more complete examination of the protective sweep doctrine.
see Kelder & Statman, supra note 59.
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(2) Vale may permit a warrantless entry into premises after a lawful
arrest outside the premise, on no showing at all, in order to check for
confederates or persons who might destroy evidence.
The first proposition is so restrictive that officers can virtually never
make a warrantless entry to prevent the loss of evidence. Normally, they
will be unable to determine from the outside what is actually happening
on the inside. The second proposition may be unduly permissive, be-
cause the mere arrest of a resident would authorize a warrantless entry to
discover persons who might destroy evidence. Such conflicting interpre-
tations have been responsible for much of the confusion in this area. Vale
can be cited in virtually every case in which one wishes to argue that
threatened destruction of evidence justifies a warrantless entry, and its
ambiguities frequently allow it to be cited by both sides.
D. A New Factor Emerges: Gravity of the Offense
Since Vale, the Court has offered further guidance for determining
the appropriateness of a warrantless intrusion in only one case. In Welsh
v. Wisconsin, 62 the Court reversed a conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated. After driving his car off the road and abandoning it, Welsh walked
to his home and went to bed. Police, on information from a witness who
had seen Welsh driving his car erratically, went to his home, entered
without a warrant, and arrested him. The prosecution argued that the
warrantless entry to arrest was necessary to prevent the destruction of
evidence. 63 Here, as in Schmerber, the evidence in danger of destruction
was the level of alcohol in the blood. The Court rejected that argument
and reaffirmed the special protections afforded the home, noting that it
had never actually permitted a warrantless entry of a home except in hot
pursuit. 64 Notwithstanding the fact that the alcohol in the defendant's
blood was being destroyed, the Court held that exigent circumstances did
not justify the warrantless entry.65 The Court noted that hesitancy "in
finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless arrests in the
home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense
62. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
63. In Welsh, the Court also addressed the government's other contentions that "hot
pursuit" of the suspect and prevention of physical harm to the suspect and the public justified
the warrantless entry into the suspect's home, id. at 753, but the Court found the government's
"hot pursuit" claim "unconvincing" based on the lack of "immediate or continuous pursuit"
of the suspect from the crime scene. Id. Similarly, it rejected the government's public safety
claim because the suspect had already abandoned his car and was in his home. Id.
64. Id. at 750.
65. Id. at 754.
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for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor." '66
The gravity of the offense as a determinant of an emergency is a new
consideration in exigent circumstances analysis. Although the Court
does not reject the notion that exigent circumstances may justify a war-
rantless entry into the home, Welsh offers more support for a limited
reading of that proposition than for the expansive view accepted by many
of the circuits.
67
E. The Justices' Diverging Views
The Court's denial of certiorari in Vasquez v. United States6 pro-
duced supporting and dissenting opinions discussing destruction of evi-
dence as an exception to the warrant requirement. 69 Vasquez arose out of
the investigation of a cocaine distribution ring, some of whose members
were arrested outside an apartment building believed to contain drugs.
One of the arrestees told the police that they had come from an apart-
ment on the second floor. The police went to a second-floor apartment,
were admitted, and after the occupant of the apartment created a com-
motion that could have been heard by anyone remaining in the building,
were informed that the persons arrested outside the building had been in
and out of a fourth-floor apartment throughout the day.
The officers decided to enter the fourth-floor apartment, fearing that
confederates might be in the apartment destroying evidence. Their belief
was based on the fact that one of the arrestees was lightly clad and key-
less, from which the officers inferred that someone remained in the apart-
ment to readmit him, and that the arrests outside the building and the
disturbance following the investigation at the second-floor apartment
probably would have alerted any remaining confederates to the presence
of police. After entry, the police seized items in plain view and items
discovered after a more extensive search, although no one else was in the
apartment. 70 The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision to
admit only the plain-view evidence.
7 1
The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and White dissented because they believed the circuit court had applied a
66. Id. at 750.
67. See infra notes 134-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the approaches
adopted by the District of Columbia, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits.
68. 454 U.S. 975 (1981).
69. The opinion in support of the denial of certiorari was authored by Justice Stevens, id..
and the opinion in opposition to the denial of certiorari was authored by Justice Brennan and
joined by Justices Marshall and White. Id. at 983.
70. Id. at 979.
71. Id. at 980-82.
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"security check" exception to the warrant requirement, an exception not
yet recognized by the Court.72 Justice Brennan argued that the Court's
decisions do not support such an exception:
[T]he Constitution has never been construed by this Court to allow the
police, in the absence of an emergency, to arrest a person outside his
home and then take him inside for the purpose of conducting a war-
rantless search .... Indeed, our precedents can more reasonably be
read as interpreting the Fourth Amendment to bar the warrantless en-
try of a residence predicated solely on the belief that persons on the
premises, knowing of the arrest, might destroy evidence.
73
Justice Stevens, who supported denial of certiorari, did not dispute
the dissenting Justices' view that a security check exception to prevent
the destruction of evidence had never been sanctioned by the Court, but
denied certiorari on other grounds, including the possibility that the cir-
cuit courts agreed on the issue.74 As will be seen in section II, any agree-
ment among the circuits is only superficial. If a majority of the Court
shares this opinion it may explain the Court's reluctance to consider the
question. 75 Although the Supreme Court traditionally has viewed de-
struction of evidence as an exigent circumstance that may justify war-
rantless action, it has thus failed to provide a principled basis for
determining when, or under what circumstances, evidence is sufficiently
threatened with destruction to justify a warrantless entry. Vale, the lead-
72. In his dissent, Justice Brennan stated:
['Jhe Court of Appeals purported to identify and apply a "security check" exception
to the warrant requirement which ... would allow warrantless entry into a home
following an arrest outside, if the arresting officers possess a reasonable belief that
third persons are inside and aware of the arrest, "so that they might destroy evi-
dence .. " The exception thus stated not only authorizes the police to enter a home
without a warrant in circumstances far less compelling than we have recognized, but
permits law officers, in determining the time and manner of executing an arrest, to
contrive their own exigency and thereby avoid the necessity of procuring a warrant
before entering the home.
Id. at 983. "Despite the currency of the doctrine in the lower courts, no decision of this Court
supports the existence of a general 'security check' exception to the warrant requirement." Id.
at 987.
73. Id. at 987-88 (quoting Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818, 820 (1969) and citing Vale
v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970)).
74. Justice Stevens notes that Justice Brennan "correctly points out that there are sub-
stantial arguments favoring a grant of certiorari." Id. at 976. Since Justice Brennan's only
argument is that the security check exception to prevent the destruction of evidence relied
upon by the Second Circuit has not been sanctioned by the Court, it is not unfair to assume
that Stevens is not convinced of its appropriateness himself. Rather he bases his decision to
deny certiorari on the possible lack of standing of the defendant, the limited, narrow holding of
the court below, and the assertion that there was no allegation in the petition for certiorari that
there is a conflict between the decision of the court of appeals in this case and any other court
of appeals decision. Id. at 976-77.
75. See supra note 25.
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ing case on entries into residences to prevent loss of evidence, produces
confusion rather than illumination. The only instance when evidence
was properly seized without a warrant to prevent its destruction was in
Schmerber, in which the evidence was actually in the process of destruc-
tion and the seizure did not require entry into a home. When entry into
a home is at issue, the gravity of the offense may determine whether the
exigency is sufficiently pressing to justify crossing the threshold without a
warrant, even when evidence is in the process of destruction. Finally, at
least three Justices of the Court believe it is time for reconsideration of
the matter. A close examination of the situation as seen by the circuit
courts may persuade the remainder.
II. The Circuit Courts' View of Destruction of Evidence as a
Justification for Warrantless Searches
The circuit courts are in disarray on the justification necessary to
permit warrantless actions to prevent destruction of evidence. Although
all recognize that potential destruction of evidence may justify warrant-
less action, 76 and although none limit such action, as suggested in Vale,
to instances in which evidence is in the process of destruction,77 their
approaches are otherwise varied. Some circuits require the presence of
specific factors. For example, the Third and Fourth Circuits use a five-
factor test to determine whether warrantless action is justified. 78 Other
circuits have rejected a checklist approach for determining when exigent
circumstances exist, instead looking to the totality of the circumstances
76. See, e.g., United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Altman, 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.
1985); United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United States v. Thompson, 700
F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Eddy, 660 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir.
1981); United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Renfro, 620
F.2d 569 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 902 (1980); United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d
Cir.), ceri. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
77. See, e.g.. United States v. Gallo-Roman, 816 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.
1987); United States v. Altman, 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Moore, 790
F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984). cert. denied.
471 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v. Garcia, 741 F.2d 363 (11 th Cir. 1984); United States %,
Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984); United States v. Elkins.
732 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1981): United
States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir
1980).
78. See United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1973).
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in each case.79 The differences among these formulations themselves are
not necessarily important. The important constitutional consideration is
whether cases decided under these tests produce different results, because
if they do, an individual in one part of the country will enjoy more pro-
tection from government intrusions than an individual in another part of
the country, a result that is unacceptable.
It is difficult to categorize and compare the approaches taken by the
circuits.8 0 Some have never articulated a specific test or mode of analy-
sis, while others have offered more than one formulation.81 Additionally,
even among those circuits that have set up a specific test, typically
worded as "reason to believe that evidence is threatened with imminent
destruction,"8 2 the results are often different, and among the circuits
79. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 470 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Flickenger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 1978).
80. Other commentators created categories for evaluating exigent circumstances justify-
ing warrantless entries into the home for the purpose of arrest. See Donnino & Girese, Exigent
Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L. REV. 90 (1980); Harbaugh & Faust,
supra note 53. Both of these efforts, however, concentrated on the way in which the reviewing
court has organized its focus for determining the presence or absence of exigent circumstances.
Neither examined the factors that courts have actually considered relevant when determining
the presence or absence of exigent circumstances. Donnino and Girese divided the courts into
three groups. The first, called "qualitative," is defined by the authors as an attempt to "reduce
the constellation of facts believed relevant to finding exigent circumstances into a set of enu-
merated factors that appear to be both all-encompassing and easy of application." Donnino &
Girese, supra, at 99. The second approach, designated the "definitional" approach, was
thought to be similar to the first, but "rather than an enumerated list of factors, the enunciat-
ing court attempts to utilize a comprehensive definition, indicating what considerations are
important to the issue." Id. at 106. The third approach, designated "holistic," neither em-
ployed enumerated factors nor formed an all-encompassing definition, but left the question to
be resolved on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 109. Harbaugh and Faust, on the other hand, took a
simpler approach and divided the courts into two categories, the checklist standard or the
totality of the circumstances test. Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 53, at 224. Although possibly
instructive in comparing what the courts say when deciding on the presence or absence of
exigent circumstances, these methods are not helpful in evaluating what results a court would
reach in a given situation.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 134-44, showing that the Sixth, Eighth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits have not created specific tests; see also infra text accompanying
notes 89-92, which shows that the First Circuit has stated its test differently on various
occasions.
82. See United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The test for
exigent circumstances is whether police had 'an urgent need' or 'an immediate major crisis in
the performance of duty afford[ing] neither time nor opportunity to apply to a magistrate.' ");
United States v. AI-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The Ninth Circuit has de-
fined exigent circumstances as 'those in which a substantial risk of harm to the persons in-
volved or to the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to delay a search [or
arrest] until a warrant could be obtained.' "); United States v. Farra, 725 F.2d 197, 199 (2d
Cir. 1984) (Exigent circumstances existed where "there was a substantial risk that evidence
would be removed or destroyed and that innocent [people] would be harmed or significantly
inconvenienced."); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 947-48 (5th Cir. 1983) ("To
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that employ different-sounding tests the results are often the same.
Needless to say, merely comparing the way the courts formulate the vari-
ous tests is unsatisfactory. The results reached in similar factual circum-
stances must also be considered.
Two considerations are relevant in determining whether an emer-
gency endangering evidence exists. The first is the nature of the threat,
whether it is genuine and imminent or merely speculative. The second is
whether the threat, although genuine, was foreseeable or otherwise
avoidable. If the emergency was foreseeable, a warrant could have been
obtained; and if it was avoidable, the government should not be able to
benefit from the exigency.
How critically courts evaluate the claim of danger directly controls
the results they reach. Using this analysis as a point of departure, the
circuits can be divided into three groups. The first group considers both
parts of the factual question. These courts require: (1) an objectively
verifiable factual showing of an emergency, and (2) that police obtain a
warrant if possible, thereby obviating the need for warrantless action.
This is the "examine-avoid" approach. At the other end of the spectrum,
the courts of the second group do not carefully scrutinize the police
claim that an emergency exists or consider whether it would have been
possible to obtain a warrant and avoid warrantless action. This group
uses the "uncritical" approach. The third group is in the middle. These
courts require a verifiable factual showing of emergency, and usually
consider whether a warrant could have been acquired before the warrant-
less intrusion occurred, as do the courts in the first group. In contrast,
however, this group does not require that police avoid the need for war-
rantless action by planning ahead. This group exemplifies an "examine-
only" approach. Obviously, the same case may be decided differently,
depending on the circuit that happens to consider it.
prevail on [the exigent circumstances] exception, the government must demonstrate that the
agents had reason to believe that the evidence was in danger of imminent destruction."), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 2255 (1986); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983)
("When officers have reason to believe that criminal evidence may be destroyed.., or removed
... before a warrant can be obtained."); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (Ist Cir.
1979) ("[T]he possibility that evidence will be destroyed.., has been recognized as a sufficient
exigency to justify warrantless entry."); United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 268 (3d Cir.)
("When Government agents ... have probable cause to believe contraband is present and, in
addition, based on the surrounding circumstances or the information at hand, they reasonably
conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search war-
rant, a warrantless search is justified."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
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A. The Examine-Avoid Approach
The first group is composed of the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits,
and is the most protective of fourth amendment values. This group also
places the heaviest restrictions on police action. These courts require the
police to have factual information that justifies the conclusion that an
emergency exists. An unsupported belief that an emergency exists or a
belief based on surmise or conjecture is not enough. 83 These courts de-
mand objective facts that permit a reviewing court to evaluate the appro-
priateness of the warrantless intrusion. They also require police to obtain
a warrant if it is possible to do so, viewing the ability to secure a warrant
before the danger of destruction ever arises as vitiating a claim of emer-
gency.84 Although police are not required to secure a warrant at the first
possible moment, warrantless action occurring a reasonable time after
police have probable cause and are able to seek a warrant is suspect,
requiring at least an explanation for the failure to obtain one. 85 In this
way, these courts refuse to allow lack of police preparation to justify war-
rantless action.
These courts require police to plan ahead and to avoid action that
may create the situation later claimed to be an emergency, because they
recognize that some circumstances that might otherwise justify warrant-
less action are foreseeable. 86 For example, this group would prohibit po-
lice from engineering an arrest of a suspect on the street outside his
home, knowing that people are inside who might destroy evidence, and
then basing a claim of emergency on circumstances created by the arrest.
Even though the subsequent emergency may be real, the need to act
without a warrant could have been avoided by arresting the suspect
outside the view of individuals in the residence or by obtaining a warrant
before making the arrest.
Reciting the general nature of the examine-avoid approach perhaps
masks the fact that this group also exemplifies how courts can articulate
their tests differently yet reach the same results. As will be shown in this
section, the First Circuit's articulation of its test appears quite different
from those of the Third and Fourth Circuits. Despite their semantic dif-
ferences, all three evaluate the facts underlying the claim of emergency
similarly.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 117-24.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 99-109, 125-28.
85. See infra notes 103-04, 126 and accompanying text.
86. See itfra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
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(1) The First Circuit's Test
The First Circuit has articulated different standards for evaluating
the government's use of warrantless activity to prevent the destruction of
evidence. In 1985, the court stated:
In determining whether the circumstances of a case fall into one
of the emergency conditions characterized as exigent circumstances,
the court must consider: the gravity of the underlying offense; whether
delay poses a threat to police or the public safety; the likelihood that
the suspect will escape if not quickly apprehended; and whether there
is a great likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if the arrest is
delayed until a warrant can be obtained.
87
Only a year later, the court stated: "A number of courts, including
our own, have held that such exigent circumstances exist when govern-
ment agents reasonably believe that evidence will be destroyed or a sus-
pect will flee if an immediate entry is not made. '" 8 8  The earlier
formulation is far more specific than the general proposition more re-
cently stated.89 The court has not made clear whether it has intention-
ally abandoned the first test in favor of the new test. Prior to these cases,
the court had expressed itself in at least two other ways.90
87. United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1985).
88. United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986).
89. This approach closely resembles the checklist approach of United States v. Dorman,
435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The District of Columbia Circuit created one of the tests
frequently cited by other circuits and by the Supreme Court in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.
740, 751-52 (1984), for evaluating the presence of an exigency. Destruction of evidence was
not at issue in the case in which the test was developed. In Dorman, the court considered
whether an arrest warrant was required before the police could enter private premises to make
a routine felony arrest. The court concluded that a warrant was required. The court then
considered whether there were exigent circumstances that excused the police from getting a
warrant. The court then listed seven factors that, although not exclusive, were relevant to
determining whether an exigency existed. These factors include whether: (1) a grave offense is
involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to
be armed; (3) probable cause clearly exists beyond a mere minimum showing; (4) existence of a
strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) a likelihood that
the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; (6) the circumstance that the entry, though
not consented to, is made peaceably; and finally (7) which the court says works in more than
one direction, whether the entry was made at night. Dorman. 435 F.2d at 392-93. Although
some of these factors, may be helpful in evaluating the presence or absence of an emergency
involving the possible destruction of evidence, quite obviously some of the factors are com-
pletely irrelevant.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656, 658 (1st Cir. 1984) ("imminent
destruction, removal, or concealment of the [evidence] to be seized may ... justify warrantless
entry into a dwelling"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985); United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d
41, 44 (Ist Cir. 1980) ("whether there is such a compelling necessity for immediate action as
will not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant"). Although these two statements by the court
do not represent different "tests," they do exemplify the absence of a particular formulation
affirmatively adopted by the court and consistently applied.
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Notwithstanding the somewhat different articulations of its test, an
evaluation of the decisions indicates a consistent approach. In practice,
the court conducts a three-part inquiry: (1) whether there are objective
facts to support the claim that the evidence in question was in danger of
destruction or removal; (2) whether police could have obviated the need
for warrantless action by taking an alternate course; and (3) whether
police adopted the least restrictive intrusion permitted by the
circumstances.
United States v. Palumbo9' exemplifies the First Circuit's analysis.
After Palumbo's arrest away from his home for selling narcotics, govern-
ment agents sought a search warrant for the Palumbo home.92 The po-
lice decided to "secure ' ' 93 the house pending application for the warrant,
because a government computer indicated that the defendant's wife was
rumored to be in the drug business with her husband. 94 An agent feared
Palumbo's failure to return home would alarm his wife and cause her to
destroy any drugs in the house, 95 or that she may have known of
Palumbo's arrest directly, because there were many witnesses to the
arrest, and Palumbo was well-known in the area.96 The court found that
the police had insufficient evidence to support their apprehensions 97 and
held the warrantless entry and occupation of the defendant's home to be
illegal. 9
8
In evaluating the need for warrantless action, the First Circuit con-
91. 742 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1114 (1985).
92. Id. at 658.
93. The court uses the word "secure" and places it in quotations. Id. at 658. The court
was referring to the police officers' arrival at the defendant's home, the entry of a number of
police officers over the objection of defendant's wife, and the subsequent initial search through-
out the Palumbo home. Id. at 658-59.
94. Id. at 658. The use of rumors contained in computerized data bases as investigatory
tools has been noted by Doernberg and Zeigler:
The crime analysis system utilized in Long Beach, California, has gone one step
beyond mere "crime analysis." In addition to moving vehicle citations and pawnshop
loan reports, Long Beach has computerized field interview reports "to document sus-
picious occurrences for which no criminal violations can be identified" for use in
subsequent investigations. This computerized criminal rumor information system
commenced operation in December 1972.
Doernberg & Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing: An Analysis of Computerized Crini-
nal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1110, 1175 n.306 (1980).
95. Palumbo, 742 F.2d at 658.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 657. Although the court found the entry and occupancy of the Palumbo home
illegal, no evidence was acquired as a result of the illegal search since the items later discovered
and seized were the result of independent probable cause and a valid warrant. For other exam-
ples of the courts' examination of the existence of an emergency, see United States v. Moore,
790 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979).
January 1988] WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
sistently considers whether the police could have obtained a warrant or
otherwise avoided warrantless action. For example, in Niro v. United
States,99 FBI agents had probable cause to believe that certain evidence
was in the defendant's leased garage as recently as the evening before
they took action, at which time they began to watch the premises.' ° ° At
noon the following day, two cars believed to belong to the defendant
arrived at the building. The agents, seeing trucks in the open doorway,
entered the garage, arrested the occupants and after a search, seized sto-
len liquor,' 0' although what prompted them to act is not clear from the
opinion. No warrant had been sought.10 2 Suppressing the evidence, the
court noted that although failure to obtain a warrant is not necessarily
fatal to a search or seizure, when the police previously had probable
cause, at least some countervailing factors, not present in Niro, were nec-
essary to excuse the failure. 103 As the court noted,
[p]roceeding without a warrant is not to be justified, as the government
suggests here, by the fact that by the time the officers act, dispatch is
necessary to avoid flight or injury to person or property. Haste does
not become necessary in the present sense if the need for it has been
brought about by deliberate and unreasonable delay. This would allow
the exception to swallow the principle. 10
Similarly, in United States v Adams, 105 the police went to defend-
ant's apartment with probable cause to believe she was harboring a fugi-
tive. They knocked on the door and were met by the defendant. The
defendant denied that the fugitive was there, but after a search the fugi-
tive was found in a closet. 0 6 The court struck down the search because
there was no reason for the officers not to have obtained a warrant before
going to the apartment. 0 7 The court, however, acknowledged that after
the police knocked on the door, which they did not need a warrant to do,
there was a reasonable basis for believing that an emergency existed. 10 8
Thus, in both cases the First Circuit refused to allow an avoidable emer-
gency to justify warrantless action. 0 9
99. 388 F.2d 535 (lst Cir. 1968).
100. Id. at 536.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 537.
103. Id. at 539.
104. Id. at 540.
105. 621 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 43.
107. Id. at 44-45.
108. The fugitive would presumably not remain at the apartment if they left to get a
warrant.
109. See United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979) (upheld the warrant-
less intrusions only after considering whether a warrant could have been obtained before the
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The First Circuit further limits warrantless intrusions by requiring
police to adopt the least restrictive intrusion the circumstances permit.
In Palumbo, the court stated:
When... an exigency is found, however, the least restrictive in-
trusion is to be adopted, or the whole constitutional requirement for
obtaining a warrant would be defeated. When it is known that no one
is presently on the premises, they may be secured merely by guarding
the entrances. When persons are present and such persons may reason-
ably be feared to pose a substantial threat to destroy evidence, more
intrusive action may be proper. Even then, the police might be well
advised to give the occupants a choice of exiting the premises. This
might be accompanied by a very quick and limited pass through the
premises to check for third persons who may destroy evidence. 110
Thus, the First Circuit; after carefully considering whether an emer-
gency exists and evaluating whether the police could have avoided war-
rantless action, further requires that the entry be no more intrusive than
necessary. Typically under this approach a warrantless entry will be per-
mitted to prevent the emergency from occurring or to limit its damage.
Even after such an entry, however, a warrant must be acquired before a
full search will be permitted.'1 '
(2) The Third and Fourth Circuit's Test
The Third and Fourth Circuits employ a test created by the Third
Circuit in United Stated v. Rubin, 112 only three years after the Supreme
Court's decision in Vale. 113 Rubin picked up a crate at an airport and
took it home. The government knew the crate contained hashish. The
agents sought a search warrant while keeping the defendant and his
home under surveillance. Before a warrant could be acquired, the de-
fendant drove away from his home and was arrested. As he was being
taken into custody, the defendant shouted to spectators, "call my
brother." The agents, fearing that someone would do so and thereby
endanger evidence remaining at the defendant's house, returned there,
arrested the occupants and seized the hashish.' 
14
police arrived at the premises and concluding that no warrant would have issued); United
States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 226 (lst Cir. 1978) (upheld a warrantless intrusion that
preceded a search by warrant, after concluding that the agents acted with all reasonable dis-
patch in organizing the information necessary to support a warrant and in obtaining one).
110. Palumbo, 742 F.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
111. United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 16 (Ist Cir. 1986); United States v. Di Gregorio,
605 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979).
112. 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 833 (1973).
113. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). The Fourth Circuit case adopting the Rubin test is United States
v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981).
114. Rubin, 474 F.2d at 264.
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The Third Circuit asked initially whether Vale should be read liter-
ally as requiring evidence to be in the process of destruction to justify a
warrantless search. 15 The court concluded that the language in Vale
should not be read literally because it was not intended as a new standard
but rather as a finding of no emergency on the facts of that case." ,6 The
Rubin court after explaining the possible standards for judging warrant-
less searches under emergency circumstances, announced the following
general rule: "When Government agents ... have probable cause to be-
lieve contraband is present and, in addition, based on the surrounding
circumstances or the information at hand, they reasonably conclude that
the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a
search warrant, a warrantless search is justified."' '7 After noting that
circumstances vary from case to case, the court went on to list those that
it considered relevant:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of time neces-
sary to obtain a warrant;
(2) reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed;
(3) the possibility of danger to police officers guarding the site of
the contraband while a search warrant is sought;
(4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are
aware that the police are on their trail; and
(5) the ready destructibility of the contraband and the knowledge
that efforts to dispose of narcotics and to escape are characteristic be-
havior of persons engaged in the narcotics traffic." 8
The Rubin factors represent a very similar test to the three-part in-
quiry used by the First Circuit.' 9 Initially, the First Circuit asks
whether a genuine emergency exists: whether there are facts supporting
the police claim of exigency.'
20 The second,' 2' fourth, 22 and fifth
123
Rubin factors address the same question. Each factor involves an evalua-
tion of the genuineness of the emergency and corresponds to the initial
115. Id. at 267.
116. Id. at 267-68.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 268-69.
119. See supra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
121. For instance, in looking to the second factor, the Court in Rubin noted that the of-
ficers had found hashish dust on the defendant's clothing at the time of his arrest and this
supported their belief that the drug was in the process of being packaged and distributed.
Rubin, 474 F.2d at 269.
122. In Rubin, this factor was established when after being arrested the defendant yelled
"call my brother." Id. The officers could have reasonably believed that accomplices had been
alerted. Id.
123. The fact that evidence is narcotics establishes the ready destructibility of the
contraband.
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aspect of the First Circuit's test. Both the Third and Fourth Circuits
focus on the facts that lead to a reasonable belief that the contraband will
be destroyed. 124 None of the courts assume that contraband will always
be destroyed or that the mere presence of persons other than the defend-
ant is enough to justify a warrantless search. All examine the facts upon
which such a belief could be based.
After examining the existence of an emergency, the First Circuit
considers whether warrantless action could have been avoided. 125 The
first Rubin factor (the degree of urgency involved and the time needed to
obtain a warrant) 126 asks the same question. Both tests ask when prob-
able cause first existed and how much time it would have taken to get a
warrant. 127 Both tests also require that the police not create the
emergency. 128
Although the First Circuit's final requirement, that the police use
the least intrusive means possible if warrantless action is necessary, is not
124. See, e.g., United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263 (4th Cir. 1984) (court rejected govern-
ment's claim of emergency after evaluating facts that lead to the officer's search of warehouse);
United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1984) (court rejected government's claim
that in light of recent arrests and wide-spread publicity, the warrantless entry into defendant's
house to arrest missing suspect was necessary to prevent escape or destruction of evidence
based upon an examination of the fact), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v.
Turner, 650 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1981) (warrantless action justified since based on facts that co-
defendant told officers that premises were occupied by participant that could have witnessed
arrest); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1980) (court reversed conviction
when it found no objective indicia that contraband was about to be destroyed); United States v.
Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973) (court approved search after noting that defendant yelled
"call my brother" when being arrested in front of friendly bystanders); United States v. Wil-
cox, 357 F. Supp. 514, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (mere presence on premises of persons other than
defendants is not enough to justify a belief in a threatened destruction of evidence and an
ensuing warrantless search).
125. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
126. Rubin, 474 F.2d at 268.
127. For First Circuit illustrating this approach, see supra notes 99-109 and accompanying
text. For Third Circuit examples, see Rubin, 474 F.2d at 268, and United States v. Wilcox,
357 F. Supp. 514, 518-19 (E.D. Pa. 1973). For Fourth Circuit examples, see United States v.
Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267-68 (4th Cir. 1984), and United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1204-
05 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200-04 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Finally, if
there was concern regarding the destruction of evidence in the immediate aftermath of the
arrest, that easily could have been cured by obtaining a warrant to search the house for evi-
dence prior to the Baltimore arrest. The government will not be allowed to plead its own lack
of preparation to create an exigency justifying warrantless entry."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105
(1985); United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 318 (3d Cir. 1980) (officers created emer-
gency by forcibly entering defendant's residence without warrant during undercover sale of
narcotics, alerting sellers to undercover agents identity and thereby endangering evidence);
United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1980) (federal agents created danger that
escaped convict would evade capture by knocking on door of hideout rather than seeking a
warrant before attempting entry).
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explicit in the Rubin factors, 129 both the Third and Fourth Circuits do, in
fact, impose a similar limitation. In United States v. Velasquez, 1 30 a DEA
agent purchased drugs from the defendant and arranged for a subsequent
purchase at defendant's home. While the agent was inside the house, but
before the sale was completed, several back-up officers forced their way
in and searched the entire house, finding drugs in a bedroom.' 3' No
arrest or search warrants had been obtained. The Third Circuit con-
cluded that the facts did not justify the warrantless search: "We do not
believe that the threat of destruction of evidence, escape, or physical
harm to the police officers, justified the extensive search conducted here.
We therefore conclude that the search was overbroad and that the evi-
dence seized should have been suppressed as the product of an unconsti-
tutional search."' 132 Thus, the court faulted the police for acting more
broadly than the emergency required. The Fourth Circuit has adopted a
similar approach. 13
3
Although the three circuits employing the examine-avoid approach
use two tests that sound very different, they evaluate the presence or ab-
sence of an emergency in similar fashion. All three circuits' careful scru-
tiny of the facts underlying the government's actions represents the
traditional judicial skepticism about police decisions to act without a
warrant. All three circuits' use of the earliest time a warrant could have
been acquired as the measuring point in judging the existence of an emer-
gency tends to restrict warrantless action to circumstances when a war-
rant could not have been obtained. Lastly, the courts' insistence that
warrantless action be as limited as possible encourages respect for the
privacy protections of the fourth amendment. This approach sharply
contrasts with the uncritical approach used by several other circuits, to
which we now turn.
B. The Uncritical Approach
At the other end of the spectrum, in sharpest contrast to the First,
Third, and Fourth Circuits, are the three circuits that accept police alle-
gations of emergency without critical evaluation of the factual bases of
129. The third Rubin factor, consideration of the potential harm to the officers if they
merely guard the site while a warrant is sought, is an example of a less restrictive alternative.
130. 626 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 316.
132. Id. at 318-19.
133. United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1984). The court stated: "The
available government manpower at the house was sufficient to prevent flight from the house,
and entering the house created a situation of danger at least comparable to that which might
have been presented by a fleeing suspect." Id. at 1204.
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the claims and without considering whether the police might have
avoided the need for warrantless action. This group is composed of the
Sixth, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits. Each of these circuits
applies a case-by-case approach; none has a stated test for guiding the
police or trial courts in evaluating the presence of an emergency.
(1) District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit is the least willing to critically
evaluate the police officer's decision, particularly in narcotics cases. 134
The circuit's sentiments were clearly expressed in United States v.
Johnson:
[E]xposure to only a few narcotics cases is enough to know that evi-
dence in the form of narcotics is peculiarly vulnerable to speedy and
easily accomplished destruction; and that very vulnerability is some-
thing that police officers in the course of their narcotics enforcement
duties must be unfailingly conscious of and repeatedly speculate about
if they are to function effectively to protect the public interest. The
District Court had no basis for second-guessing the police on this ques-
tion, and it can hardly be said to have erred in refraining from doing so
on this record.
135
The facts of Johnson, however, hardly suggest an emergency. Act-
ing on a tip, police went to a building and through a basement window
saw drugs being packaged. It was the middle of the night, and there was
no reason to believe that the occupants were aware of the police presence.
Recognizing that assistance would be needed to force entry, the officers
returned to headquarters. An Assistant United States Attorney advised
the officers that it would take one and one-half to two hours to get a
warrant and suggested that the drugs would in all likelihood be removed
in that time. Thirty to forty minutes after their first observation, the
officers returned to the premises, entered without a warrant, and con-
ducted a full search, discovering evidence hidden in various places.
136
The court not only failed to question the basis for the United States At-
torney's suggestion that the narcotics would be removed in the relatively
short time required to get a warrant, but also saw no reason to require
that the officers maintain the status quo and seek a search warrant before
134. The District of Columbia Circuit's reluctance to be critical about a decision to act
without a warrant is not limited to narcotics cases. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 595
F.2d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court accepted police officers's fear that waiting to get a war-
rant before entering suspect's apartment to search for a sawed-off shotgun would present a
danger, notwithstanding the fact that the "fear" was based on the belief that the suspect, who
had been arrested for disorderly conduct for firing a handgun at home, might be released on
bail before a warrant was obtained, a remote and easily avoided danger).
135. 561 F.2d 832, 844 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
136. Id. at 834-36.
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taking the more intrusive action of conducting a full-scale search. The
court expressly rejected the possibility of a stake-out until a warrant was
acquired. 137 The District of Columbia Circuit is unique in this respect,
differing from the two other circuits that also use the uncritical
approach. '
38
The court's deferential treatment of the police's conclusion that an
emergency existed, and its unquestioning acceptance of the estimate of
the time required to obtain a warrant, sharply contrasts with the ex-
amine-avoid approach. Similarly, the disfavor with which the District of
Columbia Circuit viewed stake-outs in Johnson is an implicit refusal to
consider whether the evidence could have been protected by a less intru-
sive alternative. As a result, there is no requirement that the police
maintain the status quo while seeking a warrant once an emergency is
present. 13 9
(2) The Sixth and Eighth Circuits
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits also generally accept the assessment
by the police that an emergency exists. The refusal of these courts to
focus on the point when probable cause first existed contributes to their
deference to police judgment. For example, in United States v.
Palumbo, 140 the Eighth Circuit found exigent circumstances present
when, during the course of an undercover drug purchase, one of the sell-
ers unexpectedly decided to accompany the undercover agent to get the
purchase money, which the agents had no intention of actually deliver-
ing. The police decided to enter the sellers' hotel room, without a war-
rant, to arrest the remaining participants before they learned of the police
presence and destroyed or removed the drugs. Although the original
plans did not call for this entry, the possibility that everything would not
go as expected was certainly foreseeable. Moreover, the officers had
probable cause to search the hotel room even before they went to the
hotel, but they had not bothered to get a warrant. Nonetheless, the court
expressly rejected the prior existence of probable cause as a factor to be
considered:
That the officers might have obtained a warrant before going to
137. Id. at 844. According to the court, "[s]takeouts are full of dangers that the objects of
it may thereby be alerted to the presence of the police, and can accordingly destroy or conceal
the narcotics, thereby frustrating the police entry when it finally comes." Id.
138. See United States v. Eddy, 660 F.2d 381, 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Korman, 614 F.2d 541, 545 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); United States v.
Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 1976).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984).
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the hotel is not fatal to the finding that exigent circumstances justified
their entry.... That the exigency might have been foreseeable does not
invalidate the entry and arrest. The important point is that the exi-
gency, while perhaps not unexpected, was not created by the
officers. 141
Thus, unless the emergency is created by police action, the Eighth
Circuit refuses to consider whether it might have been avoided and
whether a warrant might have been obtained.
In United States v Elkins, 142 the Sixth Circuit went even further,
accepting a claim of exigency even though the emergency was created by
government agents. In Elkins, agents had probable cause to believe con-
traband was at the defendant's premises before they set out to complete a
drug transaction that they had set up. After the transaction was com-
pleted, agents remained outside the premises, maintaining surveillance
while a search warrant was sought. Two cars began to pull out of the
driveway, but instead of waiting for them to drive out of sight of the
premises, "[a]t least six law enforcement officers and three cars flashing
blue lights drove up into the driveway to confront the exiting vehicles
and arrested their two drivers." 143 Fearing that the occupants of the
house, now alerted by the commotion, would destroy the evidence, of-
ficers entered the house and seized evidence. 144 The Sixth Circuit, in
evaluating the search, ignored the fact that the officers had probable
cause even before they went to Elkins' house, and that the course of ac-
tion that later created the exigency was created by the police.
The three circuits in this group, although following the same
Supreme Court precedent and evaluating similar police activity, decide
cases very differently from the examine-avoid circuits. Unlike the ex-
amine-avoid courts, the uncritical courts neither evaluate police allega-
tions of exigency nor consider what actions the police might have taken
to avoid the need for warrantless activity. By failing to include the previ-
ous existence of probable cause in weighing a claim of emergency, the
courts employing the uncritical approach give police officers no incentive
to obtain a warrant before an emergency arises. As compared with the
examine-avoid courts, the courts in this group are much more likely to
permit avoidable warrantless intrusions.
141. Id. at 1097 (citations omitted).
142. 732 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 1283. One car was driven by defendant's teenage son, while the other car was
driven by a person who was charged but acquitted.
144. Id.
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C. The Examine-Only Approach
The last approach, utilized by the largest group of courts, falls some-
where between the previous two groups. Like the courts using the ex-
amine-avoid approach, this group is more demanding than the courts
using the uncritical approach when evaluating police claims of emer-
gency. Like the courts using the uncritical approach, however, these
courts do not require that police avoid warrantless action by planning.
On the other hand, they do not permit police to create the emergency.
This group includes the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Elev-
enth Circuits. The Second Circuit will be discussed separately, however,
as it is the only circuit that has developed a specific test.
(1) The Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
The approaches of the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits are similar. All apply a generally worded test rather than a list
of specific factors, and all require that reviewing courts conduct a critical
and independent analysis to determine whether the facts justify warrant-
less action.145 As with the courts employing the examine-avoid ap-
proach, all of these circuits require a factual basis for the warrantless
intrusion and do not accept police claims of exigency at face value.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's claim
of exigency in United States v. Torres, 146 in which officers investigating
drug smuggling traced a large quantity of marijuana to a house. The
officers arrived at the house in the early hours of the morning and ar-
rested a man leaving the residence. At that time, the police noticed mari-
145. United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 947-48 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he government
must demonstrate that the agents had reason to believe that the evidence was in danger of
imminent destruction."), later app., 720 F.2d 385 (1983); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d
582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983) (exigent circumstances exist if a reasonably prudent, cautious and
trained officer would conclude that evidence may be destroyed before a warrant can be ob-
tained); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11 th Cir.) (government must demon-
strate that the exigencies prevented the agents from securing a search warrant), cert. denied.
464 U.S. 914 (1983); United States v. Kunkler. 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982) ("When
police officers, acting on probable cause and in good faith, reasonably believe from the totality
of circumstances that (a) evidence or contraband will imminently be destroyed . . . exigent
circumstances justify a warrantless entry, search or seizure"); United States v. Rosselli, 506
F.2d 627. 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (" [W]arrantless search is not justified unless the agents 'reason-
ably conclude that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before they can secure a search
warrant.' ").
146. 705 F.2d 1287 (11 th Cir.), vacated en bane. 718 F.2d 998, on remand. 720 F.2d 1506
(1983), later op., 741 F.2d 1323 (1984) (defendants failed to establish requisite expectation of
privacy in house in which they were arrested and thus lacked standing to challenge warrantless
entry and search of house; decision did not affect previous affirmation of co-defendant Gomez's
conviction).
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juana residue, pieces of burlap, leaves, and seeds strewn around a van
parked in front of the house and leading to the doorway. The officers
entered the house, arrested the occupants, and seized evidence in plain
view. 147 The government argued that the warrantless entry was proper
to avoid the "risk of loss, destruction, removal, or concealment of the
marijuana."' 48 Suppressing the evidence, the court found it improbable
that the two hundred pounds of marijuana involved could easily have
been destroyed, holding as follows: "There [was] no evidence that [the
defendants] were aware of the officers' surveillance; thus they had no rea-
son to destroy the contraband or to flee the premises."' 49 The Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have made similar analyses.'5 0
Although these courts do not require the same level of planning by
the police as do the examine-avoid courts, they give more weight to the
fact that a warrant could have been obtained than do those that are less
critical. The courts using the examine-only approach also consider the
point at which probable cause existed in deciding whether the urgency of
the situation required warrantless action.
For example, in United States v. Berick, 151 the police, after arresting
a chemist who illegally manufactured a controlled substance, learned
that four people remained at the laboratory site, that they were armed
and that the chemist was late in returning to the laboratory.' 52 The Fifth
Circuit upheld the warrantless entry of the laboratory because there was
147. Id. at 1290.
148. Id. at 1297.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 (9th Cir. 1985) (the court sup-
pressed evidence stating, "[b]ecause of the intrusive nature of a warrantless arrest, the govern-
ment must demonstrate specific and articulable facts to justify the finding of exigent
circumstances, and this burden is not satisfied by leading a court to speculate about what may
or might have been the circumstances"); United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 948 (5th
Cir. 1983) (Where police made a warrantless entry into defendant's home during the course of
an undercover drug operation; the court remanded because "[w]hat is missing in this record is
any actual indication that the agents entered Thompson's home because they believed that
they were faced with a 'now or never' situation ... where they would have to seize the goods
immediately or risk their disappearance."); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.
1983) (although the court did admit the evidence, it closely examined the factual circum-
stances and concluded that the emergency was real); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627,
630 (7th Cir. 1974) (The court suppressed evidence discovered after a warrantless entry into
defendant's apartment. The police had tried to justify that entry on an emergency caused by
the unsupervised freedom of another defendant's girlfriend after some of the conspirators had
been arrested with her knowledge. The government had argued that she might try and contact
the remaining defendant and alert him to the danger. The court rejected this possibility as not
based on facts.).
151. 710 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 918, cert. denied sub non. Culver v.
United States, 464 U.S. 899 (1983).
152. Id. at 1037.
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not enough time to get a warrant. 153 Such judicial examination of the
time necessary to get a warrant is also found in the decisions of the Sev-
enth, 5 4 Ninth,155 Tenth,156 and Eleventh 157 Circuits. These courts en-
courage the use of warrants by considering the ability to get a warrant in
evaluating the presence of an emergency.
These circuits, however, do not insist that police avoid the need for
warrantless action by advance planning. Thus, this approach does not
encourage police officers to "think warrant!" as Judge Kelly of the Tenth
Circuit urged in dissent in United States v. Cuaron. 158 For example, in
United States v. Glasby, 159 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a conviction
based on evidence acquired after a warrantless entry of defendant's apart-
ment when the emergency on which the entry was based could easily
have been avoided. Police officers made a controlled delivery 160 of a
package to defendant's house at 7:10 a.m., a time when no magistrate
was available to issue a warrant. While waiting for a warrant to be is-
sued, officers keeping the premises under surveillance saw the defendant's
father leave the building at 7:45 and arrested him.161 The subsequent
warrantless entry into the defendant's house was sanctioned by the court
because agents "had seen the defendant looking out from the back porch
of his apartment and reasonably could have believed that he had seen his
father followed and that the agents who were coming toward him would
want to search his apartment for the heroin."' 162 The court ignored the
fact that the delivery was controlled by the police. There was no reason
to execute this elaborate plan at a time when a magistrate was unavaila-
153. Id. at 1038.
154. United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1974).
155. United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Where the police have
ample opportunity to obtain a warrant, we do not look kindly on their failure to do so.").
156. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983) ("The time necessary to
obtain a warrant is relevant to a determination whether circumstances are exigent.").
157. United States v. Torres, 705 F.2d 1287, 1297 (1 1th Cir.) ("even in the middle of the
night, a warrant can be obtained by telephone"), vacated en banc, 718 F.2d 998, on remand,
720 F.2d 1506 (1983), later op., 741 F.2d 1323 (1984).
158. 700 F.2d 582, 593 (10th Cir. 1983).
159. 576 F.2d 734 (7th Cir. 1978).
160. A "controlled delivery" is the delivery of a package suspected of containing contra-
band under circumstances that are within the control of the investigating officers and make
possible the identification and arrest of the originally intended recipient. In this instance, a
postal inspector was notified in Chicago that two days earlier United States Customs officials
had seized mail containing heroin. The parcel had been mailed from Thailand addressed to
the defendant's Chicago residence. Upon receipt of the parcel in Chicago, further testing con-
firmed that the substance was heroin. Officials photographed the contents, resealed the pack-
age in its original wrapping, and had it delivered to the defendant. Id. at 736.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 738.
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ble or to arrest the father within sight of the apartment. Similarly, the
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all decide cases in this area
without requiring that police avoid the need for warrantless action.
163
The courts in this group, however, do prohibit the police from rely-
ing on an emergency that they have created. In United States v. Allard, 1
64
police arrested a drug seller and learned from him that Allard was his
source. Police proceeded to Allard's hotel room, knocked on the door
and entered. 165 The government claimed that exigent circumstances jus-
tified the warrantless entry into the hotel room. The court held that
threatened destruction of evidence could not justify an entry since there
was no reason for the occupants of the room to know about the seller's
arrest until the officers knocked on the door.' 66 If the officers had not
knocked, there would not have been an emergency.
Although not as clear as in the examine-avoid approach, it appears
that the examine-only courts also require that the intrusion be as limited
as the circumstances require. No cases are reported in which the court
was faced with a police intrusion that extended beyond a limited security
check while a warrant was being obtained. Language in the decisions
implies that such a procedure is mandatory. For instance, in United
States v. Cuaron, 167 the court stated its rule as: "the circumstances are
163. See, e.g., United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 327 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1106 (1985) (Where police made a warrantless entry of defendant's hotel room at
least ten hours after the police had probable cause upheld, the court stated: "[t]hat the exi-
gency was foreseeable at the time the decision was made to forego or postpone obtaining a
warrant does not, by itself, control the legality of a subsequent warrantless search triggered by
that exigency."); United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1986) (where warrantless
entry was made into supplier's house after arrest of courier, and the location of supplier's
house was known to police before arrest, the court made no analysis of whether a warrant
could have been acquired before evidence was actually endangered); United States v. Cuaron,
700 F.2d 582, 594 (10th Cir. 1983) (According to the dissent, over 20 officers were involved in
the arrest, at least one of whom could have been delegated to begin preparing for a warrant
during the two and one-half hours between the identification of the dealer's house and the
warrantless entry. If a magistrate had been sought and placed on standby, a telephonic war-
rant would have been available on a moment's notice and certainly within the 50 minute period
between the courier's arrest and the entry into the premises.); United States v. Harris, 713 F.2d
623 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (The Police made arrangements to complete a drug sale at defendant's
home hours before the planned meeting. The deal went as planned. The undercover officer
entered the home, inspected the drugs and then left, ostensibly to get money. When he re-
turned, he was accompanied by a number of other officers who fanned out throughout the
house arresting occupants and seizing evidence. Although seeking a warrant after the officer
left the house would have endangered the evidence, the need to enter was a virtual certainty
before the operation began.)
164. 600 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979), later app., 634 F.2d 1182 (1980).
165. Id. at 1302-03.
166. Id. at 1304.
167. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
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considered sufficiently critical to permit officers to enter a private resi-
dence in order to secure the evidence while a warrant is sought."'1 68
(2) The Second Circuit
Like the other courts that employ the examine-only approach, the
Second Circuit determines whether an emergency actually existed rather
than merely accepting the police assessment of the situation. Similarly,
it does not impose an obligation to avoid warrantless action when possi-
ble. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit's approach deserves individual
treatment because the court has formulated a specific test, similar to the
two-tiered analysis suggested by Vale. 169 The Second Circuit distin-
guishes cases in which the police need to enter premises to protect evi-
dence from those in which, after a legal entry, police conduct a limited
search to protect evidence. If the police are legally on the premises, they
may conduct a search to determine whether any persons are present with
or without grounds for believing that there are persons present or that an
emergency exists. This security check is similar in scope to the sweep
initially conducted in Vale, 170 although in this instance the police must
already be inside the premises. By contrast, if the police must enter
premises, either to prevent evidence from being destroyed or to make an
arrest, a factual showing of urgency is required.
In United States v. Gomez, 171 the court permitted police to make an
arrest after a lawful entry and to conduct a "security check" or "protec-
tive sweep." The court defined this type of search as a "very quick and
limited pass through the premises to check for third persons who may
destroy evidence or pose a threat to the officers."' 172 The court found
authority for this exception in the reasoning of Chimel v. California, 173
168. Id. at 586.
169. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
171. 633 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
172. Id. at 1008 (quoting United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 1980)).
173. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court held that a search incident to an arrest must be
limited in time and place but could be justified because:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for
the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be gov-
erned by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested
can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
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which permits a limited search of the person and the area within his
reach after a lawful arrest.
174
The circuit has used similar reasoning to justify a security check:
The reasonableness of a security check is simple and straightfor-
ward. From the standpoint of the individual, the intrusion on his pri-
vacy is slight; the search is cursory in nature and is intended to
uncover only "persons, not things." Once the security check has been
completed and the premises secured, no further search-be it extended
or limited-is permitted until a warrant is obtained. From the stand-
point of the public, its interest in a security check is weighty. The
delay attendant upon obtaining a warrant could enable accomplices
lurking in another room to destroy evidence. More important, the
safety of the arresting officers or members of the public may be jeop-
ardized. Weighing the public interest against the modest intrusion on
the privacy of the individual .... a security check conducted under the
circumstances stated above satisfies the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.
175
As was the case with the security check in Vale, 176 and the search
incident to arrest in Chimel, the Second Circuit does not require any
factual showing other than a prior lawful arrest to justify a security
check.
177
The Second Circuit applies a different rule when police make a war-
rantless entry solely to protect evidence from destruction' 78 after an
arrest or other exigency occurring outside of premises that are thought to
contain evidence. The court applies a two-part test. First, there must be
person and the area "within his immediate control"--construing that phrase to mean
the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence.
Id. at 762-63.
174. See also United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 530 (2d Cir. 1980) (where the court
found that the reasoning in Chimel supported a quick security check of premise following an
arrest), cert. denied, Mesa v. United States, 450 U.S. 970 and 454 U.S. 847 (1981), cert. denied,
Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975 (1981).
175. United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 834 (1980).
176. See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
177. Vasquez, 638 F.2d at 530.
178. Although the two types of cases defined by the Second Circuit's rules will probably
cover most circumstances in which the government seeks to justify warrantless action that is
supported by the possible destruction of evidence, there is a third potential pattern. Destruc-
tion of evidence could also be a justification for entry in order to arrest, as well as for entry
after an arrest (rule 2) or for a search after arrest (rule 1). In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a warrantless entry to make a routine felony arrest is
unconstitutional, absent exigent circumstances. One such exigent circumstance might be
threatened destruction of evidence. When faced with this type of situation, the Second Circuit
uses neither of its own tests, but instead applies the factors enunciated by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in United States v. Dorman, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See supra note 91
for a discussion of the Dorman factors.
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a reasonable belief that someone is inside the premises. Second, there
must be a reasonable belief that the persons in the premises are aware of
the events outside, thereby creating an incentive to destroy evidence, es-
cape, or jeopardize the safety of the officers or the public.17 9 The police
must have a factual basis for their entry in each case.' 80 As with the
Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit
requires that police be able to specify the facts upon which they base
their claim of exigency. '
8
The Second Circuit's approach resembles other examine-only cir-
cuits because it does not require police to "think warrant" or to plan
ahead to avoid warrantless action. For example, in United States v. Mar-
tinez-Gonzalez, 182 government agents had probable cause late in the after-
noon that an apartment in New York City contained contraband. The
agents decided to keep the apartment under surveillance after an Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney told them that it was too late to obtain a warrant.
Later, when the tenant emerged, the agents walked toward the suspect
with their badges displayed. Not surprisingly, the suspect retreated into
the apartment, with the officers at his heels. A warrantless entry and
seizure followed.' 83 The court upheld the conviction without any consid-
eration of whether the decision not to seek a warrant was reasonable or
necessary, and whether the circumstances justified the officers' precipi-
tate action.
Although the Second Circuit test is stated quite differently than the
totality-of-the-circumstances test used by the other members of this
group, the outcome of a case reviewed under any of them is likely to be
the same. All of the courts in this group conduct an independent exami-
nation of the facts underlying the emergency, but none of them require
that the police make any effort to avoid the need for warrantless action.
In conclusion, threatened destruction of evidence is accepted in
every circuit as a justification for warrantless action. Although all of the
circuits' rules sound similar on the surface and can be paraphrased as a
requirement that the police reasonably conclude that evidence is in dan-
ger of imminent destruction or removal, the tests vary as applied. The
courts all require the same legal conclusion, but they do not consider the
same facts in reaching that conclusion.
179. Agapito, 620 F.2d at 336 n.18.
180. Id. at 336.
181. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
182. 686 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1982).
183. Id. at 96.
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III. A Hypothetical Case Comparison of the Three Approaches
A similar case considered by courts using different approaches is
likely to produce different results. The following section seeks to illus-
trate this point by analyzing one hypothetical case using each of the three
approaches described above. For purposes of the following discussion,
assume the police have probable cause to believe that there are drugs in a
particular house, but do not obtain a warrant because they have no im-
mediate plans to enter. They arrange for an undercover officer to buy
drugs from one of the residents of the house. The sale takes place several
miles away, and the seller is arrested immediately. Although the police
have no warrant, they believe there is a serious risk that the evidence in
the house will be removed or destroyed. The officers' belief that immedi-
ate action is necessary is based on many years of experience investigating
drug traffickers, the ease with which drugs are destroyed, and the fact
that there is not enough time following the arrest to secure a warrant.
Accordingly, after the arrest, officers enter and search the house, which
has been under continuous surveillance. They arrest several occupants
and seize large quantities of drugs found in closed containers.
A. Application of the Examine-Avoid Approach
If this case were being decided by the examine-avoid courts, the evi-
dence would be suppressed for three reasons. First, the officers' belief
that there was an emergency was based merely on speculation, not on the
facts of the case. The courts using this approach require that police be
able to articulate facts underlying their belief that an emergency exists.184
There was no reason to believe that the occupants of the house would
destroy evidence. Moreover, there was no reason to believe they knew
about the arrest or the fact that they were under suspicion. Therefore,
there was no reason to think that the evidence in this situation would
have been destroyed before a warrant could be obtained.
Second, the need to act without a warrant was avoidable. The ex-
amine-avoid approach requires the police to "think warrant" and to pre-
pare themselves sufficiently to avoid the need for warrantless action. 8 5
The police had probable cause before they set out to buy drugs from the
seller, and because the possibility that his arrest would make it necessary
184. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 742 F.2d 656 (Ist Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1114 (1985); see supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968); see supra notes 99-104
and accompanying text.
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to enter the premises where the drugs were stored was foreseeable, there
was no reason for the police not to take a warrant with them.
Finally, the evidence would be suppressed because the scope of the
search was unnecessarily broad. The proper procedure would have been
for the officers to "secure" the premises and obtain a search warrant
before conducting a full search of the house.
186
B. Application of the Examine-Only Approach
If this case were considered by courts using the examine-only ap-
proach, the evidence would also be suppressed, but for only two reasons.
As with the examine-avoid approach, the examine-only courts require
the presence of facts upon which the police allege an emergency. 187 Thus,
the allegation of emergency here would be rejected, because there was
not a factual basis for believing any confederates would destroy the drugs
before a warrant could be obtained. Second, the examine-only courts
would also suppress the drugs because the scope of the search was too
broad. They require that the police maintain the status quo and obtain a
warrant before conducting a full search.1
88
Unlike the examine-avoid approach, however, this approach would
not require that the police avoid the need to act without a warrant
through preparation. Notwithstanding the fact that the officers had
probable cause before they set out, they should have anticipated the need
to enter and obtained a warrrant, and courts using this approach would
have admitted the evidence. If there had been a factual basis for the
officers' allegation that evidence was in danger, such as Rubin's com-
mand "call my brother"'18 9 and if the officers had merely secured the
premises and sought a warrant before making a search, the officers' fail-
ure to get a warrant would be accepted. The only proviso is that the
officers may not affirmatively create the emergency.' 90
C. Application of the Uncritical Approach
The courts using the uncritical approach would admit the evidence
uncovered by the officers. Unlike the other two groups, these courts
186. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1986). See supra text accom-
panying note 111.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), later app., 720 F.2d 385
(1983). See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983). See supra note 167
and accompanying text.
189. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1973).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd on other
grounds, 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
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would accept the police allegation of emergency. 191 Courts in this group
refuse to second guess the police. They defer to the police officers' expe-
rience investigating drug cases and recognize the easy destructibility of
narcotics, even if there is no evidence of an actual emergency in the case
being considered.192 Additionally, this group does not require police to
avoid the need for warrantless action. 93 Finally, depending on the cir-
cuit in the group considering the case, the courts may not require that
the officers maintain the status quo before conducting a full search. 194
D. Summary
It is clear that the circuits disagree about the permissibility of war-
rantless intrusions based on the threatened destruction of evidence. They
also disagree about the factors that should be considered in making the
determination. The examine-avoid courts closely examine the factual al-
legations that evidence is endangered and require that officers provide
articulable facts upon which to base that allegation. They also require
that police avoid warrantless activity if possible, and, accordingly, that
they look to the point at which a warrant could first be obtained to de-
cide whether the failure to do so was reasonable. Finally, they limit the
extent of warrantless activity by requiring that it be the least intrusive
possible in the circumstances.
The uncritical courts stand in sharp contrast. They accept police
claims of emergency without critical analysis. They effectively elevate
the ready destructibility of narcotics to a presumption that narcotics may
be destroyed in every case. In these circuits, warrantless intrusions are
approved because destruction of evidence is conceivable, not because the
danger is necessarily present in a particular case. Not surprisingly, these
courts do not require that police anticipate possible emergencies; as long
as the exigency, foreseeable or not, was not created by the police, war-
rantless intrusions are permitted.
The last and largest group falls between the examine-avoid courts
and the uncritical courts. These courts insist that the danger be real and
imminent, as do the examine-avoid courts. On the other hand, they do
not require that the police "think warrant"; thus, their approach resem-
bles the uncritical approach.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S.
907 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 134-39.
192. Johnson, 561 F.2d at 844.
193. See, e.g., United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1984); see supra text
accompanying notes 140-41.
194. See, e.g., Johnson, 561 F.2d at 834-36, 844; see also text accompanying notes 134-41.
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The result of such divergent approaches is that the outcome of a
case depends on the circuit in which it is pending. This is an unsatisfac-
tory result when constitutional rights, theoretically national in scope and
uniform in meaning, are involved. Section IV discusses this need for a
uniform rule and section V proposes a rule to unify the circuits' ap-
proaches to the problem of destruction of evidence. The rule balances
law enforcement's need for speedy and unrestricted action with the
fourth amendment's respect for individual liberty and concerns about
overreaching government.
IV. The Need for an Appropriate Rule
The Supreme Court has not yet provided a clear and reasoned ap-
proach to determine when a threat of destruction of evidence justifies a
warrantless intrusion. The lower federal courts have provided several
different approaches to the problem, with varying results in similar cases.
It is undesirable for circuit courts to interpret constitutional rules differ-
ently. The federal system has but one Constitution. Different interpreta-
tions of the Constitution produce unequal treatment of citizens.
Similarly situated persons should receive equal treatment under the
law. 195
Although it has been said that intercircuit conflicts are in some cases
beneficial, 96 after a certain period of time the need for certainty and uni-
formity outweighs whatever benefits are derived from an ongoing debate
among the circuits. 197 The circuits have struggled with this problem for
more than a decade. It is time for a unified rule.
Most of the circuits do not encourage police officers to seek warrants
whenever possible. Such an approach permits warrantless searches that
could have been avoided, and further creates the possibility that a broad
new exception to the traditional warrant requirement will emerge. Such
an exception could develop if the courts take the next step and rule that
195. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of.Appeals: The Threat to the Func-
tion of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542. 601-02 (1969); Commission on
Revision of the Federal Appellate Court System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recon-
inendations for Change, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 206-07 (1975).
196. See United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 177 (1984) (White, J..
concurring).
197. See, e.g., Note, Using Choice of Law Rules to Make Intercircuit Conflicts Tolerable, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1078, 1080-85 (1984) (the need for uniformity in the federal circuits is pre-
mised on the notion that like situated people should receive similar treatment and that since
federal law has only one "correct" interpretation, a lack of uniformity means at least one
federal court is "wrong," a situation that requires a solution).
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the mere presence of drugs near the scene of an arrest or elsewhere per-
mits a warrantless seizure.
Prevention of destruction of evidence may thus continue to be
treated as a sub-class of the exigent circumstances exception to the war-
rant requirement, or it may become, de jure or de facto, a separate excep-
tion. The difference is crucial. Warrantless intrusions based on the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement must be
based on facts known to the officers making the entry. 198 For example, in
Vale, the Court disapproved warrantless action because the danger to
evidence was too speculative when the police acted.199 If destruction of
evidence, however, becomes a separate exception to the warrant require-
ment, rather than a form of exigent circumstance, a showing of need in
the particular case may no longer be required.
Both the automobile exception and search incident to arrest are ex-
amples of this phenomenon. Although originally justified by the need to
preserve evidence from destruction in individual cases, 200 each no longer
requires such a showing. Each has become a per se rule permitting war-
rantless searches, provided the search is of a car 201 or pursuant to a law-
ful arrest.20 2 In both situations, the Court has found that an emergency
198. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 457 (1948).
199. Vale, 399 U.S. at 34.
200. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (warrantless search of person incident
to arrest limited in scope to the necessities that justify exception); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless search of car stopped on highway upheld since automobile
"can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought"),
201. The exception to the warrant requirement in automobile cases has changed from one
dependent on the facts of the particular case into one that applies without regard to the cir-
cumstances surrounding the search. This movement is clear from the Court's decisions in
Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964), and Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
In Preston, the police arrested the defendants and had their car towed to a garage. Shortly
thereafter, the officers, without a warrant, searched the vehicle finding evidence. The Court
suppressed the evidence, holding that the search was unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment because, inter alia, the men were under arrest and the car in police custody. "[There was
no] danger that the car would be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction." Preston, 376 U.S.
at 368. The search was illegal since there was no danger of removal or destruction of the
evidence. In Chambers, however, the Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile on
essentially the same facts. The defendants were arrested for robbery and taken into custody.
The automobile was towed to the police station, where officers conducted a thorough search,
finding weapons and evidence linking defendants to the robbery. The Court admitted the evi-
dence, holding that the search was within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
despite the fact that the defendants and automobile were safely in police custody. Chambers,
399 U.S. at 52. This per se exception has been made explicit by the Court in subsequent
holdings. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 (1985) ("A vehicle lawfully in police
custody may be searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contains contraband,
and there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify such a warrantless search.").
202. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the Court limited searches incident
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so often exists that warrantless searches now are permitted in all cases in
these categories.
20 3
Similarly, courts may find that destruction of evidence in narcotics
cases is so prevalent that warrantless searches will be permitted whenever
there is probable cause to believe narcotics are present. If fourth amend-
ment values are not to be compromised, the destruction of evidence ex-
ception should be limited to truly exigent circumstances. The
justification for the warrantless search, therefore, must be a belief that an
emergency exists on the facts of the individual case.
V. A Proposal
Any rule based on the existence of an emergency should first require
a genuine belief that an emergency exists. It could even require proof
that the evidence is actually being destroyed before a warrantless intru-
sion will be permitted. While the latter would greatly reduce the possi-
bility of an unnecessary warrantless entry or search, it would also result
in frequent loss of evidence. The legitimate needs of law enforcement
would be severely compromised; fourth amendment requirements can be
met by a more flexible rule.
To resolve these concerns, I propose the following rule. I will intro-
duce and discuss each part of the four-part rule separately.
(1) Even with probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal ac-
tivity is located on the premises, police must also have a reasonable suspi-
cion that evidence is threatened with destruction.
This suspicion must be based on articulable facts present at the time
the decision to act must be made. If police are to be permitted to act
before evidence is actually being destroyed, both police and reviewing
courts must evaluate the probability that evidence will be destroyed. One
possible standard, with which police officers are already familiar, is "rea-
to arrest to those made either "in order to remove any weapons" that may be used to resist
arrest or effect an escape or prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence; see United
States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 530, cert. denied, Mesa v. United States, 450 U.S. 970 and 454
U.S. 847 (1981), cert. denied, Vasquez v. United States, 454 U.S. 975 (1981). In United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), however, the Court held that a search of a person incident to
arrest was permissible without regard to the facts of the case.
203. In Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, for example, the Court stated:
The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while
based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weap-
ons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A custodial
arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth
Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification.
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sonable suspicion," as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio.20 4 Although reason-
able suspicion is something less than probable cause,205 it does require
police to show "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the]
intrusion.
'20 6
Requiring articulable facts permits reviewing courts to determine
whether the fear that evidence would be destroyed was reasonable.
Judge Kelly, dissenting in United States v. Cuaron, 20 7 portrayed the dan-
gers of accepting unsupported fears of destruction of evidence, particu-
larly where the fear is based on the possible destruction by a drug dealer
after the arrest of his courier:
Of course, it is reasonable to guess that drug dealers ... get ner-
vous when their couriers are delayed. They may indeed fear that the
courier has been arrested; but they may also fear that he has been
robbed by his customers, or that he has absconded with their drugs or
money. Who knows which reaction is possible, or what the drug
dealer's response will likely be? In the absence of any limiting objec-
tive evidence, a policeman's speculation as to what might occur is lim-
ited only by his imagination and his preconceptions-or, as [the
officer] might put it, his "experience." An exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement that may be established by a po-
liceman's speculative fears can scarcely be described as "specifically
established and well-delineated": it is better described as swallowing
204. 392 U.S. 21, 21-22 (1968).
205. As suggested by the Model Rules for Law Enforcement Series, the rule could require
that the officer have "probable cause to believe that such items are in imminent danger of being
destroyed or consumed." PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING,
MODEL RULES WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES 37 (rev. ed. 1974). This
language is familiar to police officers. Probable cause is the essential ingredient in all decisions
to search or arrest. The frequency with which officers must make that decision insures some
familiarity with its elements. But such a standard seems inappropriate in these circumstances.
While probable cause is not the kind of arduous standard required in trial settings (such as
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt)
it is a standard that normally is considered after some deliberation. Probable cause is too
rigorous for these circumstances. Although society requires that it be "more probable than
not" that evidence of criminal activity be present in a residence before the government may
enter one's home over one's objection, even using force if necessary, it does not follow that it
must be "more probable than not" that an emergency exists before warrantless action can be
taken. The risk is that the evidence will be lost if immediate action is not taken. Given the
prerequisite that there be probable cause to believe that seizable items or people are inside the
premises before one considers the question of whether evidence is in danger, the element of risk
present ought to accept a the greater error quotient contained in the reasonable suspicion
formulation.
206. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. The Court continued, "And in making that assessment it is
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to
the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?" Id.
207. 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983).
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the rule.
20 8
Although reasonable suspicion is not a stringent standard, it is ap-
propriate in this context. Given probable cause by the officer to believe
evidence is in the premises, the only question here is how certain the
police must be that an emergency exists that endangers the evidence
before the officer may forego the constitutional requirement of a warrant
obtained from a neutral magistrate. If, in a particular case, there is not
probable cause to believe evidence was in the location searched, that
challenge may be separately made.20 9 The reasonable-suspicion standard
should assure that the police allegation of emergency is not contrived.
But the lower standard of reasonable suspicion should be sufficient to
enable a police officer to know when he may make a warrantless entry.
The standard also enables a reviewing court to evaluate the officer's
decision.
(2) The threat of destruction must be so imminent that a warrant,
expeditiously sought, cannot be obtained in time to protect the evidence.
Time is also an important element. The danger must not only be
real; it must also be imminent. The second part of the proposed rule
requires that there not be enough time to obtain a warrant. The length of
time required to get a warrant is an essential consideration. One of the
ironies of fourth amendment law is that police are often permitted to
excuse warrantless action by arguing that it takes too long to get a war-
rant, when the only reason it takes so long is that law enforcement agen-
cies have created procedural barriers to the issuance of a warrant that are
not required either by the fourth amendment or any court.210 To en-
208. Id. at 592-93 (footnote and citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 812 F.2d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 1987) (where exist-
ence of probable cause to search business considered separately from whether exigent circum-
stances justified warrantless entry); United States v. Wulferdinger, 782 F.2d 1473, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1986) (existence of probable cause to search residence separate from consideration of
whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless entry); United States v. Moore, 790 F.2d
13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986) (whether existence of probable cause to search apartment considered
separately from existence of exigent circumstances for warrantless search of apartment);
United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1985) (probable cause to arrest
only one question, presence of exigent circumstance must also be found), cert. denied. 106 S.
Ct. 2255 (1986); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170. 174-77 (1st Cir. 1985) (probable
cause to arrest considered separately from when exigent circumstances justify warrantless en-
try into defendant's motel room); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142-45 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (whether probable cause existed to search defendant's apartment considered sepa-
rately from justification of warrantless search of apartment); United States v. Agapito, 620
F.2d 324, 332-33, 335-37 (2d Cir.) (probable cause for defendant's arrest considered separately
from whether exigent circumstances justify warrantless search of hotel room), cert. denied. 449
U.S. 34 (1980).
210. For instance, a writing is not constitutionally required for the issuance of a warrant
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courage the police to obtain warrants, courts must ask themselves
whether the process is too time-consuming. 211 Procedures that permit
police to get warrants over the telephone have been adopted by the fed-
eral government and a number of states.212 These procedures reduce the
time ordinarily needed to obtain a warrant and therefore reduce the need
for warrantless action.213 Regardless of the procedure for obtaining a
and yet a majority of states require that warrant applications be in writing. See generally R.
VAN DUIZEND, L. SUTTON & C. CARTER, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEP-
TIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES (1984). This study by the National Center for State Courts
examined, among other things, the administrative and judicial review procedures employed or
required to obtain search warrants. Included in its conclusions and recommendations was the
observation that
[o]btaining a search warrant can be a time-consuming and frustrating process....
Unfortunately, much of the intended effect of the Fourth Amendment is lost because
of the administrative impediments to obtaining a search warrant and the consequent
attractiveness of alternatives which, while legally authorized in most instances, do
not offer the same level of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. As
some of the jurisdictions we studied have demonstrated, these impediments can be
overcome with relatively little difficulty.
Id. at 105-06.
211. A number of courts have required that the police explain why they have not used a
telephonic warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Berick, 710 F.2d 1035, 1038 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 918 (1983); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 589 (10th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 479, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106
(1983); United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
212. For federal statutes authorizing telephonic warrants, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2).
For state statutes authorizing telephonic warrants, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.35.015 (1984);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3915(c) (1978); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-202 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-814.03 (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.045(2)-(3) (Michie 1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 690.36 (McKin-
ney 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1225(b) (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.545(5)
(Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23a-35-5 to -7 (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-
4 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.3(c) (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.12(3) (West 1984).
Cases in two other states have authorized telephonic warrants. See State v. Andries, 297
N.W.2d 124 (Minn. 1980); State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126, 459 A.2d 1149, 1152-53 (1983).
213. The federal statute was intended to encourage use of warrants and reduce exigent
circumstances as justification for warrantless action. The legislative history makes that clear:
Use of search warrants can best be encouraged by making it administratively feasible
to obtain a warrant when one is needed. One reason for the nonuse of the warrant
has been the administrative difficulties involved in getting a warrant, particularly at
times of the day when a judicial officer is ordinarily unavailable .... Federal law
enforcement officers are not infrequently confronted with situations in which the cir-
cumstances are not sufficiently "exigent" to justify the serious step of conducting a
warrantless search of private premises [sic], but yet there exists a significant possibil-
ity that critical evidence would be lost in the time it would take to obtain a search
warrant by traditional means.
Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1977 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2), re-
printed in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 527, 534; H.R. REP. No. 195, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1977).
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warrant adopted in each jurisdiction, the test for evaluating a threat to
evidence should always be whether the time needed to act to preserve the
evidence was less than the time necessary to get a warrant.
It is critical to determine when the obligation to seek a warrant
arises. The earliest possible moment is when police have probable cause
to believe evidence of criminal activity is located in the place to be
searched. The Supreme Court has never required that police seek a war-
rant at the first possible moment.21 4 The Court reasons that police may
legitimately wish to delay the arrest of a suspect or the search of prem-
ises. Nevertheless, a policeman contemplating warrantless action should
always be mindful of the possibility of getting a warrant. The need to act
immediately once the police have decided upon a course of action should
not automatically justify a warrantless intrusion if a warrant could have
been secured before commitment to action or if the need for speedy ac-
tion was foreseeable.
21 5
(3) The circumstances giving rise to the threat must not have been
avoidable by reasonably prudent officers and must not have been created
by the police.
Police should have to avoid the need to act without a warrant if they
reasonably can. This requirement is merely a corollary to the principle
that the police ought to be encouraged to seek warrants. Although most
courts do not require the police to obtain a warrant at the earliest practi-
cable moment, they do not permit the government intentionally to create
the exigency that justifies a warrantless intrusion. 21 6 The distinction af-
fects the point at which the court begins evaluating the presence of an
emergency, and this can produce very different results.
214. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595 (1974) ("Assuming that probable
cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search
on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are
foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment."); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) ("The police are not required to guess at their peril the precise
moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the
Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait
too long."). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-72 (1971) (holding a
seizure of evidence unconstitutional because the police had the opportunity to obtain a valid
warrant, the Court noted that "where the discovery is anticipated, where the police know in
advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it ... [t]he requirement of a warrant to
seize imposes no inconvenience whatever . . . in a legal system that regards warrantless
searches as 'per se unreasonable'....").
215. See Harbaugh & Faust, supra note 53, at 227, for a similar proposal with regard to
warrantless entries to make a felony arrest.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Allard, 600 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1979) (threatened
destruction of evidence attending police officer's knock on door held insufficient to justify war-
rantless entry into suspected drug supplier's hotel room).
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For example, when the courts require the police to avoid warrant-
less action, they refer to the police's obligation to seek a warrant before
the emergency arises. In United States v. Collazo,217 the court suppressed
evidence acquired during a warrantless search of defendant's house be-
cause the police had probable cause to believe evidence was in the house
before the emergency arose. The Collazo court stated:
[I]f there was concern regarding the destruction of evidence in the im-
mediate aftermath of the arrests, that easily could have been cured by
obtaining a warrant to search the house for evidence prior to the...
arrests. The government will not be allowed to plead its own lack of
preparation to create an exigency justifying warrantless entry. 218
Thus, the court implicitly viewed the police to have an obligation to
seek a warrant when time permitted.
By contrast, courts that only require officers to avoid creating the
emergency themselves focus on the point when the emergency arose.
United States v. Thompson 21 9 exemplifies this approach. Although the
Thompson court found the police had probable cause the night before the
warrantless entry,220 it held that "[t]he agents' failure to avail themselves
of the opportunity to obtain a warrant does not, however, end our in-
quiry, for the failure to obtain a warrant at the first opportunity is not a
fatal defect. '221 Instead, the court saw the issue as whether the govern-
ment created the exigency by using an undercover agent known to one of
the participants. The government had planned to gain lawful entry to
the house by having an undercover agent pretend to be a cocaine pur-
chaser.222 The court would have permitted the warrantless entry if the
police had not known that the defendant and undercover agent knew
each other, although the government could have obtained a warrant
hours before the need to enter arose and although the government
planned to make a warrantless entry into the suspect's premises.
(4) The invasion of fourth amendment interests must be no greater
than the circumstances require.
Even if warrantless action is needed, the intrusion should be as lim-
ited as the circumstances permit.223 If evidence is in unavoidable danger
217. 732 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Alvarez v. United States, 469
U.S. 1105 (1985).
218. Id. at 1204.
219. 700 F.2d 944 (5th Cir.), later app., 720 F.2d 385 (5th Cir 1983).
220. Id. at 949.
221. Id. at 950.
222. Id. at 949.
223. Limiting the extent of the interference with an individual's privacy is consistent with
general fourth amendment principles. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 n.12 (1969)
("And we can see no reason why, simply because some interference with an individual's pri-
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of imminent destruction, police should be permitted to take whatever
action is necessary to maintain the status quo, but they should also be
required to seek a warrant as quickly as possible before proceeding with a
full-scale search.
In most instances the preferred procedure should be a security check
or protective sweep followed by securing the premises while a warrant is
sought. For example, if police have reason to believe that suspects know
of the discovery of their criminal enterprise and possess evidence that is
easily destroyed, the police may permissibly enter the premises and check
the house for persons who might endanger the officers or destroy evi-
dence. The officers could not permissibly search for evidence before
seeking a warrant, because the emergency would be over and the officers
would have sufficient time to obtain a warrant.
224
In the unusual case, a more thorough search might be necessary to
prevent the loss of evidence. For example, in United States v. Altman,
225
after the police lawfully entered the defendant's premises, they saw him
drop something into a crawl space in a closet. The officers lifted a trap
door and retrieved nine pounds of hashish floating in water.22 6 The court
permitted what might normally have been outside the scope of a permis-
sible warrantless search, since "it is plain that when [police] observe ac-
tivity that indicates that evidence is being destroyed, the agents may act
immediately to save the evidence from destruction. '227 But in no in-
stance should the warrantless activity be more intrusive than necessary to
avoid the exigency that justified dispensing with the warrant in the first
place.
The proposed four-part rule includes all the elements of the ex-
amine-avoid approach used by the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits. It
differs from that approach, however, because it provides guidelines that
permit the police to determine whether the facts justify warrantless ac-
tion. The rule's goal is to encourage police officers to get warrants when-
ever possible. Police officers are much more likely to follow a rule they
understand.
The proposed rule differs from those employed by the other two
groups because it is more faithful to the fourth amendment's preference
for warrants. Unlike both the uncritical approach and the examine-only
vacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automati-
cally be allowed.").
224. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (Ist Cir. 1979).
225. 797 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1986) (evidence actually in process of destruction rather than
threatened destruction).
226. Id. at 515.
227. Id. at 516.
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approach, the proposed rule requires police to avoid warrantless action if
possible. Unlike the uncritical approach, the proposed rule also insists
that the police be able to articulate reasons for their belief that an emer-
gency exists and that they limit the degree of intrusion to that required
by the circumstances. The experience of the courts employing the ex-
amine-avoid approach shows that this aspect of the suggested rule is
workable. The proposed rule, by clearly defining the circumstances in
which police can take warrantless action, will make it more useful both
to the police operating under it and the courts enforcing it.
Conclusion
Preventing the destruction of evidence ought to be a justification for
warrantless action in certain circumstances. A standard appropriate for
evaluating whether an emergency exists must accommodate the compet-
ing concerns of law enforcement and privacy. Society has a growing fear
about crime, but enthusiasm for law enforcement may lead to aggressive
police work at the expense of the privacy protections provided in the
fourth amendment. Apprehension and conviction of criminals ought not
to be so difficult that citizens lose faith in the ability of government to
provide protection. Yet every rule that seeks to control police behavior
inevitably makes the conviction of some criminals more difficult. None-
theless, those rules are absolutely necessary to prevent arbitrary govern-
mental intrusions of privacy.
The Supreme Court has mentioned the prevention of destruction of
evidence as a justification for warrantless action. It has not, however,
defined the factual circumstances that justify warrantless action in this
context. The particular susceptibility of narcotics to destruction and the
nation's rising concern about drug usage foreshadow an increasing use of
the destruction of evidence rationale to justify warrantless action. The
circuit courts have considered the question, but they have failed to de-
velop a coherent constitutional standard. Multiple views exist as to when
evidence is sufficiently in danger of destruction to justify warrantless ac-
tion, and as a result, the fourth amendment's restraining influence on
unreasonable police behavior and its protections of individual's privacy
vary from circuit to circuit-as if they had different constitutions.
A standard that encourages police officers to obtain warrants when
possible is needed. It should require police officers to have reasonable
suspicion that evidence is in imminent danger of destruction, and that
suspicion should be based on facts articulable when the decision to act
must be made. The danger must be so pressing that delay for the time
needed to secure a warrant threatens the evidence. The danger must also
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be such that reasonably prudent officers could not have avoided the need
for warrantless action. Lastly, the intrusion must be no greater than the
circumstances require.
Such a rule will permit warrantless action when it is needed, but it
will also forewarn officers not to rely unduly upon the possibility of war-
rantless action. Thus, the valued fourth amendment right of privacy will
be better protected from erosion.
